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Survey and Systematization of Secure Device
Pairing
Mikhail Fomichev, Flor A´lvarez, Daniel Steinmetzer, Paul Gardner-Stephen, and Matthias Hollick
Abstract—Secure Device Pairing (SDP) schemes have been
developed to facilitate secure communications among smart
devices, both personal mobile devices and Internet of Things
(IOT) devices. Comparison and assessment of SDP schemes is
troublesome, because each scheme makes different assumptions
about out-of-band channels and adversary models, and are driven
by their particular use-cases. A conceptual model that facilitates
meaningful comparison among SDP schemes is missing. We
provide such a model. In this article, we survey and analyze a
wide range of SDP schemes that are described in the literature,
including a number that have been adopted as standards. A
system model and consistent terminology for SDP schemes
are built on the foundation of this survey, which are then
used to classify existing SDP schemes into a taxonomy that,
for the first time, enables their meaningful comparison and
analysis. The existing SDP schemes are analyzed using this
model, revealing common systemic security weaknesses among
the surveyed SDP schemes that should become priority areas
for future SDP research, such as improving the integration of
privacy requirements into the design of SDP schemes. Our results
allow SDP scheme designers to create schemes that are more
easily comparable with one another, and to assist the prevention
of persisting the weaknesses common to the current generation
of SDP schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the advances in automation [1] and a rapid
growth of the consumer electronics market [2] have resulted
in a tremendous increase in the number of smart devices and
personal gadgets. For example, it is estimated that the number
of interconnected Internet of Things (IOT) devices used in
a great variety of applications will reach 24 billion by 2020
[3]. Authenticating a plethora of devices in such a dynamic
setting to provide secure communications is a challenge that
has not yet been fully addressed [4]. This stems from the
highly distributed and diverse nature of the IOT environment
which makes it impractical to apply traditional approaches
for establishing secure communications such as Public Key
Infrastructure [5].
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Secure Device Pairing (SDP) was proposed as an approach
to introduce security into the ubiquitous computing environ-
ment where devices pair in an ad-hoc manner [6]. Specifically,
two parties that have never met each other and would like to
bootstrap a secure communication channel need to perform
key exchange and authentication procedures [7]. The latter
is particularly difficult in the ad-hoc scenario, because two
pairing devices do not have any prior security context or a
common point of trust [8]. This aspect, in addition to wireless
nature of ubiquitous computing makes device pairing vulner-
able to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks [9]. Traditionally,
the MITM threat was considered as one of the core challenges
in SDP [10]. In order to overcome MITM attacks the use
of auxiliary, so-called “out-of-band (OOB)” channels was
proposed [8], [10]. Such channels aim to provide authenticity
and even confidentiality to ensure that pairing is performed
only between the intended devices, that is, no MITM has
intermediated.
Since the initial idea was put forward [6], numerous pairing
schemes utilizing various OOB channels have been proposed
both in academia and “in the wild”. A great variety of
suggested pairing schemes were studied and evaluated with
respect to security [10], [11], usability [8], [12] and user
interaction [13]. The prior work on SDP mainly considered
two distinct use-cases: a) pairing among personal gadgets of
a single user [14], and b) pairing devices of different users,
for example, smartphones [15].
With the advent of the IOT, SDP has become one of the
viable mechanisms to introduce security to this diverse and
distributed environment [16]. The applicability of SDP to the
IOT has already been demonstrated with different communica-
tion technologies, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth standardizing
a number of various pairing schemes [17], [18]. Since Wi-Fi
and Bluetooth serve as the backbone of centralized and ad-hoc
device communications in the IOT, this clearly indicates the
utmost importance of SDP in the IOT. Additionally, recent re-
search has clearly demonstrated that SDP can be successfully
applied to secure an important class of the IoT devices such
as wearables [19]–[25], for example, smartwatches, fitness
trackers, smartglasses, etc. Thus, we are convinced that the
role of SDP as an ad-hoc security mechanism in the IOT is
as important as its centralized counterpart, where a dedicated
trusted server manages the key exchange and authentication
procedures between the connected devices [5].
The complex IOT domain compounds the complexity of
SDP, as well as increasing ambiguity, because of two reasons.
First, the available hardware capabilities such as wireless ra-
dio interfaces, sensing functionality and computational power
2vary significantly among different platforms [26]. Second, the
interaction patterns among the devices as well as between
human operators and devices have become more intricate.
For instance, two devices can perform pairing without any
human involvement at all [19], [27]–[29] or a user device
can communicate with a third party device or infrastructure
without explicit consent [30], [31]. These growing trends con-
sider more heterogeneous settings and user-device interactions.
Thus, adversary models and assumptions made for pairing
here are different as compared to the “classic pairing” cases
mentioned above.
The sound comparison of various pairing schemes is not
straightforward. Several extensive surveys were conducted in
order to analyze numerous pairing schemes from different
viewpoints [8], [10]–[13]. Interestingly, all those studies come
to a common conclusion: no universal pairing approach ex-
ists. Moreover, the comparative analysis cannot be accurately
aligned and justified even over a single metric, for example,
security or usability, since there is no common ground on
what information should be provided about a pairing scheme
to make an assessment. There are two reasons why such in-
compatibility occurs. First, available hardware interfaces have
been traditionally considered as one of the main arguments for
introducing yet another pairing scheme [20], [32]–[34]. From
this starting point, the selection of OOB channels as well as
justification for user interaction modes and use-case scenarios
were made. Correspondingly, many proposed pairing solutions
focused on specific issues in a restricted setting and were rather
disconnected from the results of previous endeavors. Second,
the study on user perception of SDP revealed that a choice
of a particular pairing scheme is context and environment
dependent [35]. Hence, employing different human-centric
models widens the gap between properties deemed relevant
for pairing which causes controversy [35].
Two other issues that introduce disparity to the field relate to
a concept of OOB channel which is a cornerstone in SDP. The
first problem is a lack of common understanding as to what
constitutes an OOB channel. There were dozens of different
alternatives proposed [8], [13] which is a direct consequence
of the aforementioned design incentives behind many pairing
schemes. Several attempts [10], [36] to categorize OOB chan-
nels applied mixed terminology and overlapping adversary
capabilities which did not yield the desired clarification. The
second issue is erroneous assumptions about the security of
OOB channels which resulted in numerous attacks on various
pairing schemes [37]–[40].
As it can be seen, the field of SDP is rather fragmented.
The lack of coherent understanding of underlying key concepts
has lead to poor design decisions. That, in turn, resulted in
a myriad of pairing solutions which only focus on specific
goals, use different vocabulary and rely on unrealistic security
assumptions. Hence, we are motivated to systematize knowl-
edge in the field of SDP in order to identify the most difficult
problems and facilitate further research on this crucial topic.
We make the following specific contributions:
• A system model and consistent terminology that fa-
cilitates precise description and reasoning about SDP
schemes, by considering the three components:
– Physical (PHY) channels;
– Human-computer interaction (HCI) channels; and
– Application classes.
• Classification of the existing SDP schemes using this
model.
• Identification and analysis of systemic security weak-
nesses commonly found in such schemes, revealing areas
where future SDP research is required.
• Revelation of the rarity with which privacy is considered
among current SDP schemes.
• Principles for designing robust SDP schemes.
The reminder of this article is organized as follows. In
Section II we review existing surveys on SDP and highlight
the contributions of our work. In Section III we present our
consistent terminology and system model for SDP, and derive
an SDP taxonomy based on this model. We survey PHY
communication channels along with the representative pairing
schemes which utilize those channels in Section IV. Section
V follows, where we review the HCI channels applied to
device pairing, as well as, the corresponding pairing schemes.
In Section VI we discuss the application classes and classify
the surveyed pairing schemes with respect to their application
classes. We outline the open research challenges and provide
the future perspective on the field of SDP in Section VII. We
conclude by summarizing our findings in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In the literature several surveys have investigated different
aspects of SDP. Kumar et al. [8] presented the first compara-
tive study to quantify usability and security of various pairing
schemes. Our work reveals that quantitative comparison of
different SDP schemes is questionable due to the previously
taken design decisions, and we qualitatively address the design
aspects of SDP to enable meaningful comparison of different
SDP schemes. Two other studies from Kobsa et al. [12] and
Kainda et al. [11] focused more closely on usability and the
role of user actions to achieve security in SDP. Our work
has wider scope, because we consider the role of the user as
one of the fundamental design aspects of SDP, in addition to
physical communication media and particular use cases.
The work of Mirzadeh et al. [10] provided an extensive
survey on security and performance of different cryptographic
protocols used in various SDP schemes, in addition to pre-
senting classification of OOB channels. In our work we devise
a more fine-grained classification of communication channels
in SDP by differentiating between PHY and HCI channels,
and focus on security issues of those channels instead of
cryptographic protocols. Since security weaknesses of various
communication channels have resulted in numerous successful
attacks on different SDP schemes, we consider our qualitative
analysis of those channels as a novel contribution. In their
survey Chong et al. [13] presented different modes of user
interaction for SDP and analyzed a vast number of SDP
schemes using this taxonomy. We refine their findings to clas-
sify HCI channels and, additionally, present a set of common
security and usability properties to coherently analyze those
channels and the SDP schemes relying on them, which has
not been done before.
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(or several) devices and consider multi-device SDP outside
the scope of this article. In comparison to the prior work, our
survey is innovative in three aspects. First, we devise a novel
system model for SDP, which addresses security weaknesses
of the existing generation of SDP schemes. Second, we pro-
pose a new approach to design SDP schemes, which enables
their meaningful comparison. Third, we provide a deep insight
into a current state of SDP from the point of PHY channels,
HCI channels and application classes, as well as present an
overview of SDP challenges and perspectives in light of the
upcoming IOT.
In this section, we have reviewed the related work on SDP
and highlighted the contributions of our survey. In the next
section, we present our system model and taxonomy.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND TAXONOMY
In this section we first give a high-level overview of a
generalized pairing procedure together with widely-used nota-
tions. Second, we address ambiguity in current terminology by
providing clear definitions to describe SDP. Third, we present
a system model that illustrates the notion and properties of
communication channels as well as facilitates a more unified
approach towards the design of pairing schemes. Fourth, we
discuss threats in SDP with respect to our system model.
We conclude by explaining our taxonomy, which is used to
systematize and evaluate proposed pairing schemes.
A. The Generalized Pairing Procedure
D1 D2
1
2
3
Fig. 1. Generalized pairing procedure
Traditionally, the pairing procedure has been considered as
depicted in Figure 1. The scenario consists of two devices,
D1 and D2, which do not share any prior knowledge and
would like to pair. That is, two devices need to exchange
some secret information, ensuring it came from the correct
party, and is not obtained by any third party. In order to
achieve pairing, three steps need to be followed: 1 discovery,
2 secret exchange and 3 verification. In the first step, D1
and D2 become aware of each other, which can happen either
automatically, for example, Bluetooth discovery, or with user
assistance, for example, physical contact. During the second
step both devices exchange some cryptographic material, for
example, public keys, or a password, which can later be used to
establish secure communication. In the final step, both parties
verify the obtained secrets, to ensure that the process has not
been compromised by an attacker.
To provide a better understanding of the interactions pre-
sented in Figure 1, we examine the commonly used nota-
tion for SDP. Three main terms are commonly used in the
literature: (a) in-band channel, (b) out-of-band channel and
(c) user interaction. By employing the generalized pairing
procedure shown above, we demonstrate how those concepts
apply using a well-known example [7]. Two devices discover
each other, after having been brought together physically by
a user (c). Then they exchange hashes of their public keys
over an auxiliary channel (b), followed by a mutual transfer
of the corresponding public keys over a wireless radio link
(a). Of course, the given example illustrates just one possible
case of how the pairing flow can be implemented. There are
other variants, for example, where the discovery can happen
without user interaction as in [19], or the secret key is first
transmitted via the in-band channel, and subsequently verified
via the OOB channel as in [41].
To gain a deeper understanding of the major pairing con-
cepts, it is important to specify the characteristics of in-band
and OOB channels that have been traditionally discussed by
the research community. The pioneering work of Balfanz et al.
[7] stated two related properties that an OOB channel should
possess: demonstrative identification and authenticity, and also
that confidentiality should not be assumed.
It is authenticity which is the defining characteristic of an
OOB channel: it is the infeasibility of forging communications
over an OOB channel, without being detected, that makes
OOB communications so valuable in SDP. In practice, this
implies that OOB channels must possess demonstrative iden-
tification, that is, it must be easy to demonstrate that the OOB
communication is occuring between the intended parties, for
example, by showing the display of a device to another user.
Demonstrative identification, thus, implies that the devices
must be brought sufficiently close to one another to allow
their mutual positive identification by their users. While OOB
channels should not be assumed to offer confidentiality, a
number of the surveyed SDP schemes depended on the OOB
channels being confidential.
The in-band channel, in contrast, has been generally re-
garded as a communication channel with relaxed security
characteristics. That is, it refers to a wireless radio link which
is easily accessible by a powerful attacker [42] and, thus,
deemed as inherently insecure.
So far, we have discussed the core components of SDP
along with their prime purposes and vital properties. Yet,
there are no precise definitions of the OOB channel and user
interaction which are common in the field. We consider this
point to be the principle weakness of the existing terminology.
Many researchers have described the OOB channel to be a
side PHY channel, which is either human-perceptible and/or
directly controlled by a user [8]. Nevertheless, there is a
number of pairing schemes that intrinsically rely on user
actions to accomplish pairing [11]. One example of the latter
is Secure Simple Pairing [43] which is a de facto standard
for connecting Bluetooth devices securely. Consequently, such
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Fig. 2. System model for secure device pairing
disparity results in a situation where one part of the community
only considers physical media as the OOB instance while
neglecting the user-mediated channels, and vice versa. In
addition, communication channels differ in fundamental ways,
hence assumptions about media and attacker models vary
significantly, and are not straightforward to align.
Another issue is that the boundary between the human-
mediated OOB channels and user interaction is often blurred.
That is, the latter is a more general term that can include the
former. However, the essential purpose of the OOB channel
is to provide some form of data authenticity. Specifically, a
human operator can assist in initiating device pairing during
the discovery step, for example, by co-locating devices, align-
ing them or enabling physical contact. Yet, we argue that only
explicit actions which directly affect the security of the pairing
scheme should be considered as the OOB channel.
B. Defining Secure Device Pairing Terminology
A specific challenge to the comparison and analysis of SDP
schemes is the lack of accepted terminology covering such
schemes. We therefore present the terminology that we use
in the remainder of this article, both for clarity of explanation
here, and as a suggestion for a common vocabulary to facilitate
communications among practitioners in the future.
• Pairing refers to the establishment of a secure communi-
cation channel between two or more devices.
• An application class represents a particular pairing sce-
nario that is determined by the degree of involvement and
level of control that a user has over the pairing devices.
An application class covers use-cases that share broadly
similar security threats and objectives.
• An SDP scheme consists of the procedures, cryptographic
protocols and the motivating application class required to
securely pair devices.
• An SDP method or SDP procedure is the sequence of
actions required to execute an SDP scheme. While con-
sidering method and procedure interchangeable, we avoid
the synonym protocol, because of the strong association
of this word with cryptographic protocols.
• A party is someone or something who controls of one or
more devices that participate in an SDP procedure.
• A security domain is the set of devices, data, policies
and intentions that a single party controls. That is, every
device belongs to a security domain, but there may
be more than one security domain involved in a given
application class.
• A channel is a means by which communications occur
in an SDP scheme, whether over a physical medium, or
through an HCI.
• An HCI channel is a means of communication where a
user acts as the channel by which the communications
occurs by undertaking some form of interaction with the
devices involved. This could take the form, for example,
of a user reading information from the display of two
devices, and entering confirmation that they match into
one of those devices.
• A PHY channel is a communication channel that allows
data transmission or acquisition over a physical medium.
PHY channels can be described by their objective phys-
ical characteristics and where the information is not
transferred by a user, that is, it is not an HCI channel.
C. System Model
To address the issues in SDP mentioned previously, we
introduce our system model depicted in Figure 2. The objec-
tives of our approach are threefold. First, it takes into account
a set of diverse interactions that appear in the context of
IOT. Second, it aims to resolve the ambiguities in the pairing
concepts which are currently present in the field. Third, our
model facilitates a more unified procedure for the pairing
design.
Our system model contains three main components. Partic-
ularly, there are (a) two devices to be paired D1 and D2, (b)
a varying number of users and (c) the ambient environment
in which device pairing takes place. In addition, several types
of distinctive interactions can happen between those elements.
First, D1 and D2 can communicate with each other by means
of various wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, etc.
1 . Second, a device can obtain the information about the
ambient environment such as temperature, location, etc. via
its sensing capabilities 2 . Third, the connection between a
human operator and the respective device is established in a
5SECURE DEVICE
PAIRING
CHANNELS
PHY HCI
APPLICATION
CLASSES
PRIVATE PUBLIC SOCIAL UNATTENDED
Fig. 3. Taxonomy of secure device pairing
form of HCI 3 . We further consider the relationship between
a user and a pairing device. Specifically, a human operator can
either control both devices involved in SDP, a single one or
none at all. Implied in the system model is the purpose for
which the devices are being paired, that is, the use-case.
From the above, we can consider an SDP scheme as
consisting of the automated communications between two
devices over conventional PHY channels, plus the human-
mediated communications between the devices over HCI
channels. Pairing of devices always occurs for a purpose, that
is, it happens within the context of an application class. We,
therefore, use three key concepts as the foundation for our
system model:
• PHY channels.
• HCI channels.
• Application classes.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between those concepts,
that is, we consider the channels, both PHY and HCI to be
orthogonal to the application classes.
The first two concepts specify two fundamentally different
types of interactions that can be utilized by a pairing scheme.
With this in mind, we further analyze PHY and HCI channels
independently, to identify the most important features of each
class, and expose the trade-offs involved. To account for both
types of interactions, we understand “device” to mean any
physical device that possesses one or more communication
channels that can be used to connect to the outside world. SDP
is achieved using some set of such channels. Figure 4 depicts
an abstract visualization of such a device concept, including
a comprehensive list of PHY and HCI channels. A rigorous
discussion covering each channel category in detail is provided
in Section IV, for PHY channels, and Section V for HCI
channels.
As for the application classes, we identify four different
cases which cater to classify all the pairing schemes pro-
posed up-to-date. The categories are as follows: (a) private,
(b) public, (c) social and (d) unattended. The private class
corresponds to a “classic pairing” case, where a single user
either owns or directly controls two devices that ought to be
paired. The public class is related to a single user possessing
one device, where the user performs the pairing with some
third party infrastructure, for example, a payment terminal,
over which she has no control. The social class incorporates
two users who would like to securely pair their corresponding
devices. The unattended class deals with the case where two
devices belonging to the same ownership domain, for example,
owned by the same person or organization, pair with no user
involvement.
For each application class, we present distinct interaction
patterns, demonstrated by instantiating our system model
(Section VI). Furthermore, we identify commonalities in the
form of adversary capabilities, as well as security and usability
implications that have to be taken into account for a particular
application class. Consequently, it is possible to determine a
set of common security and usability properties shared by
a group of pairing schemes that have been designed with a
specific application class in mind. Section VI explores the
potential for such application classes to facilitate the design
of better, more coherent SDP schemes.
Device PHY
WI-FI
BLUETOOTH
MM-WAVES
RFID
NFC
VLC
VISUAL
IRDA
SOUND
HAPTIC
SENSING
HCI
RELAY
COMPARISON
GENERATION
HANDLING
Fig. 4. Pairing device with PHY and HCI channels. This model is indepen-
dent of application classes.
D. Worked Example
To demonstrate the relevance of our system model we
consider the security of an important class of the IOT devices
such as implantable medical devices (IMD). For example, the
6case of Dick Cheney has raised further awareness of life-
threatening repercussions stemming from the compromise of
a pacemaker [44]. Unfortunately, the current state of security
and privacy in existing IMD is still very immature [45].
To enable secure communications between the implant and a
medical programmer or a base station, used for configuring or
reading records from the implant, SDP can be applied. When
designing a pairing scheme for such a use case it is important
to understand that user interaction is restricted, that is, a user
cannot be actively involved in the pairing process. Thus, an
IMD and the maintenance equipment must pair autonomously,
which implies the unattended application class. The actual
implementation of such pairing schemes is, of course, an
open question but it is already clear that pairing paradigms
typical for the unattended application class, that is, a notion
of physical proximity or the use of contextual information
can be applied. Furthermore, communication channels used for
SDP can be more reasonably selected. For example, since the
user interaction is limited, using HCI channels as OOB does
not seem feasible, thus, the use of PHY channels is justified.
Given the critical nature of IMD, it is highly favorable to select
either some short-range and restricted PHY channel such as
60 GHz, or employ some means of sensing as an OOB channel
for SDP.
As it can be seen, starting a design process with the appli-
cation class has laid the foundation for further design steps
and established a common ground for SDP schemes targeting
IMD. The selection of communication channels in SDP is also
better justified, and corresponds to security countermeasures
proposed to mitigate attacks on IMD, that is, the application of
selective jamming [45] vs. the use of short-range and restricted
PHY channel such as 60 GHz.
E. Overview of Threats
The formulation of a detailed adversary model is beyond
the scope of this article. However, a general overview of
relevant threats is still required to meaningfully compare
different SDP schemes. We consider two pairing devices D1
and D2, as depicted in Figure 2, and assume that they are
not compromised with malware and controlled directly by
their respective owners. The goal of an adversary is always
to undermine SDP.
We focus primarily on attacks against authenticity and
confidentiality, as they are the most relevant to the SDP
process. We consider two broadly representative classes of
adversaries seeking to undermine SDP: first, those who want
to attack via PHY communications channels, and second,
those who wish to attack via HCI channels.
1) Attacks on PHY Channels: An adversary who exploits
PHY channels can mount many different attacks. The majority
of these attacks are considered particularly severe in SDP,
as they undermine the basic assumptions of authenticity and
confidentiality that SDP seeks to establish. PHY channels
used for data transmission are especially vulnerable to at-
tacks on confidentiality such as MITM and eavesdropping
attacks, while PHY channels used for data acquisition, for
example, environmental sensing, are susceptible to attacks that
undermine authenticity such as relay attacks. For example,
the adversary can reproduce the relevant sensor readings, by
manipulating the temperature or humidity to match that of a
remote location.
Regarding availability and integrity properties, the adversary
can jam or otherwise disturb the communication media which
can result in denial-of-service (DOS) attacks. While DOS is a
legitimate security issue, because it can prevent SDP, it cannot
lead to a false sense of security, that is, where two users
mistakenly believe that their devices have securely paired.
Hence, DOS can deny availability, but not subvert authenticity
or confidentiality. This stands in contrast to MITM, eavesdrop-
ping and relay attacks where the devices will behave as though
they have paired securely, when, in fact, they have not.
More sophisticated attacks such as selective jamming, dis-
turbing signal parts or bit-flipping can force retransmissions
and increase adversary’s chances of compromising SDP.
Time-based attacks, for instance, replaying previously cap-
tured packages or delaying messages in transmission can also
impair the SDP process. In our survey, we are primarily
concerned with attacks on PHY channels that can subvert
authenticity and confidentiality, that is, MITM, eavesdropping
and relay attacks. More exotic attacks on various PHY chan-
nels are discussed in the respective sections where relevant.
2) Attacks on HCI Channels: There are two main classes of
HCI adversaries: (a) an external attacker, that is, someone who
is not a legitimate pairing party and (b) an internal attacker,
that is, one of the pairing participants.
External adversaries aim to violate the authenticity and
confidentiality of the HCI channel by observing user in-
teraction, in order to be able to covertly participate in the
communications between the pairing devices. For example, an
external HCI adversary may monitor the HCI during a pairing
event, in order to also derive the cryptographic material being
exchanged during the pairing process.
Internal adversaries, on the other hand, already have such
access, but seek to use the process of pairing in order to
extract sensitive data from the other participant’s device. This
may take the form of social engineering. When the attacker’s
primary objective is to participate in the pairing, in order to
undermine the privacy of the other party, we label them as
honest-but-curious adversaries. For example, an honest-but-
curious attacker may seek to obtain the telephone number of
the other party, contrary to their wishes.
F. Taxonomy
We propose a taxonomy built upon the three key con-
cepts that have been introduced and described above: PHY
channels, HCI channels and application classes, which makes
the following two contributions to the field of SDP. First, it
provides systematization based on these three key concepts
drawn from the design space of SDP. Second, it enables
qualitative assessment and meaningful comparison of different
pairing schemes. The structure of our taxonomy is given in
Figure 3.
In order to investigate a device’s channels we adopt the
following framework. First, we identify the most important
7characteristics that are relevant to a communication channel.
For PHY channels, such parameters are measurable and
objective, whereas the HCI channels are represented by more
subjective metrics. Second, we focus on three sets of properties
that are vital in the context of SDP, namely: security, usability
and ease-of-adoption. Third, based on this structure we review
the existing pairing schemes to reveal how these properties
are addressed by a particular scheme and what are the trade-
offs. With regard to application classes, we first provide a
thorough description of each class followed by a discussion on
its specific security and usability implications. Second, we map
the proposed pairing schemes to the corresponding application
classes to provide a more systematic overview of the current
state in the field.
In this section, we have presented and motivated our system
model, as well as provided the taxonomy which we use to
survey existing SDP schemes. In the next section, we review
PHY channels and the corresponding pairing schemes.
IV. PHYSICAL CHANNELS
The PHY channels listed in Figure 4 allow a device to
communicate with other devices as well as interact with the
ambient environment. We base our analysis on several aspects
to conduct the meticulous investigation of PHY channels.
Specifically, we consider channel characteristics, known at-
tacks and ease-of-adoption to compare different types of com-
munication channels. With regard to security, we identify a set
of channel properties that have a direct security impact, namely
they indicate the amount of effort necessary to intercept the
pairing process. Furthermore, we discuss pairing schemes that
utilize each surveyed channel to show how it is employed
to achieve pairing. Finally, we summarize the most important
findings, presented in Table I, and discuss key issues from our
study of PHY channels.
A. Channel Characteristics
The physical nature of wireless communication channels is
described by different properties. The most important ones
are the frequency range of transmitted electromagnetic or
mechanical waves and the achievable data rates. In fact, the
data rate is defined by technical specifications of a commu-
nication protocol, such as the available bandwidth, coding
and modulation schemes, rather than the underlying PHY
channel. Hence, we consider this as the amount of transmitted
information in a unit of time using common state of the
art protocols. The frequency and bandwidth of a particular
channel comes along with certain propagation characteristics,
such as coverage, human perceptibility, penetration, and line-
of-sight propagation. We put these properties into security
perceptive by refining the observations made by Balfanz et
al. [7] on location-limited channels.
1) Coverage: Defines the maximum nominal distance at
which a signal on a PHY channel can be successfully received,
that is, differentiated from noise. Naturally, increasing the
sensitivity of receivers leads to wider coverage, which makes it
a questionable security property. However, the amount of effort
and cost required to receive a signal far outside the nominal
range are high. For an adversary, a PHY channel with smaller
coverage is harder to access and thus, attack.
2) Perceptibility: Specifies whether a user can perceive the
fact of data transmission through major human senses such
as sight, hearing and touch [46]. This property can have both
advantageous and harmful repercussions. On the one hand,
a benign user can be alerted if some unexpected interaction
occurs. On the other hand, an attacker can easily observe such
type of communication without any specialized equipment.
Nevertheless, this trade-off can be leveraged by secure protocol
design so that the benefits of human perceptibility greatly
outweigh the risks.
3) Penetration: The propagation properties of a particular
channel depend on the underlying physics. Both electro-
magnetic and mechanical waves are subject to diffraction,
reflection, refraction, scattering and absorption [47], [48]. With
these effects a signal can be partially or entirely blocked
which hinders the communication. Penetration characterizes
the ability of the signal to propagate trough solid obstacles
such as walls, doors, and furniture. Thus, a communication
channel with high blockage, that is, low penetration, effec-
tively limits the operation range of the channel, thus hampering
the attacker’s ability to access it.
4) line-of-sight (LOS): Signals propagate throughout the
environment and find multiple paths from the transmitter to the
receiver over several reflections, diffractions, and refractions.
As was stated above, channels are differently affected by these
factors. Generally speaking, with higher frequency diffraction
and refraction become less significant. With low multi-path
components a channel becomes dependent on LOS which is
a direct path between a transmitter and a receiver without ob-
struction. Correspondingly, non-line-of-sight communication
does not require an obstruction-free path between a trans-
mitter and a receiver. LOS enables predominantly directional
communication which hinders the ability of the adversary
to stealthily intercept the channel from outside the main
transmission beam.
B. Known Attacks
To better understand the security implications of PHY
channels in SDP we summarize the most prominent attacks
that have been reported on various physical media. This list of
attacks is by no means exhaustive but provides an overview of
common possible attacks vectors. In the literature many attacks
on widespread wireless radio channels can be found. We
summarize those and additionally present security implications
in other communication channels such as visible light, audio,
etc. Overall, our study provides a deep insight into existing
threats and outlines differences in vulnerabilities and security
properties among different PHY channels.
C. Ease-of-adoption
In order to evaluate how feasible it is for a specific channel
to be adopted in the context of SDP we compare it with a
set of available interfaces on widespread hardware such as
smartphones. We make this particular choice because of the
ubiquitous nature of smartphones which are viably considered
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Wi-Fi
(§IV-D1, pp. 8)
Wireless
Radio
Comm.
2.40 GHz–
2.48 GHz,
5.03 GHz–
5.83 GHz
1 Mbit/s–
1 Gbit/s
30 m–
250 m
# aHigh # aaaEavesdropping [49]
aaaMITM [49], [50]
aaaJamming [51], [52]
aaaDOS [52], [53]
aa  Push Button Configuration
[54]
Integrity codes [55]
Tamper-evident pairing [56]
Bluetooth
(§IV-D2, pp. 9)
Wireless
Radio
Comm.
2.40 GHz–
2.48 GHz
1 Mbit/s–
24 Mbit/s
1 m–
100 m
# aHigh # aaaEavesdropping [57]
aaaMITM [37], [57]
aaaDOS [57]
aa  Just Works [43]
mm-Waves
(§IV-D3, pp. 10)
Wireless
Radio
Comm.
57 GHz–
64 GHz
6.75 Gbit/s 10 m # aLow  aaaEavesdropping [58] aa # Push Button Configuration
[54]
RFID
(§IV-D4, pp. 10)
Wireless
Radio
Comm.
120 kHz–
150 kHz,
13.56 MHz,
850 MHz–
960 MHz,
2.45 MHz,
5.8 GHz,
3.1 GHz–
10.6 GHz,
4 kbit/s–
1.5 Mbit/s
10 m
(passive)
aaa
aaa
100 m
(active)
#
aaa
aaa
aaa
#
aMedium
aaa
aaa
aaa
aHigh
#
aaa
aaa
aaa
#
aaaEavesdropping [59]
aaaUnauthorized access
aa [60], [61]
aaaRelay [60], [62]
aaaDOS [59]
aa # Noisy tags [63]
Adopted-Pet [64]
NFC
(§IV-D5, pp. 11)
Wireless
Radio
Comm.
13.56 MHz 424 kbit/s 10 cm # aMedium # aaaEavesdropping [65]
aaaUnauthorized access [61]
aaaRelay [66]
aa  Near Field Communication
[17]
Out-of-band [67]
VLC
(§IV-D6, pp. 11)
Wireless
Visible
Comm.
400 THz–
800 THz
11 kbit/s–
96 Mbit/s
10 m  aLow  aaaEavesdropping [68] aa # KeyLED [69]
Enlighten Me! [70]
Flashing displays [71]
Visual
(§IV-D7, pp. 12)
Wireless
Visual
Comm.
400 THz–
800 THz
12 Mbit/s,
324 kbit/s
10 m
20 cm
 aLow  aaaEavesdropping [72]
aaaReplay [73]
aa  SBVLC [72]
IrDA
(§IV-D8, pp. 12)
Wireless
In-
frared
Comm.
334 THz–
353 THz
2.4 kbit/s–
1 Gbit/s
1 m # aLow  aaaReplay [74]
aaaEavesdropping [68]
aa # Talking to Strangers [7]
Audio
(§IV-D9, pp. 13)
Wireless
Acous-
tic
Comm.
20 Hz–
20 kHz
20 bit/s,
4.7 kbit/s
∼20 m,
∼4 m
 aMedium # aaaEavesdropping [39]
aaaRelay [75]
aa  Loud and Clear [41]
HAPADEP [33]
Zero-Power pairing [76]
Ultrasound
(§IV-D10, pp. 13)
Wireless
Acous-
tic
Comm.
20 kHz–
20 MHz
230 bit/s,
2 kbit/s
11 m
2 m
# aLow # aaaEavesdropping [77]
aaaRelay [77], [78]
aa H# Ultrasonic ranging [79]
Haptic
(§IV-D11, pp. 14)
Wireless
Haptic
Comm.
40 Hz–
800 Hz
200 bit/s physical
contact
 aLow # aaaEavesdropping [39] aa  Vibrate-to-unlock [80]
Shot [38]
Vibreaker [81]
Sensing
(§IV-D12, pp. 15)
Onboard
Sen-
sors
n/a n/a n/a H# an/a H# aaaRelay [75], [82]
aaaContext-manipulation
aa [75]
aaaReproducible readings
aa [38]
aaaGPS: Spoofing, jamming
aa [83]
aa H# Amigo [27]
Good Neighbor [84]
Wanda [85]
Ambient Audio pairing [28]
Zero-interaction pairing [19]
MagPairing [86]
Touch-And-Guard [21]
 -= fulfills property; H#-= partly fulfills property; #-= does not fulfill property
as a gateway for the personal IOT environment [87] as well
as the pairing mediator for the IOT devices [88]. In detail,
we employ the hardware characteristics of the fifth generation
of Nexus devices [89] as a reference to identify the common
interfaces present on an average smartphone.
D. Survey of PHY Channels
In the following, we survey PHY channels suitable for SDP
by focusing on the previously described properties.
1) Wi-Fi Channel: Wi-Fi is a wireless communication
technology based on a set of IEEE 802.11 standards and is
used to connect devices within a wireless local area network.
The most common Wi-Fi standards such as 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac
operate in 2.4 and 5 GHz frequency bands. Other frequency
bands, for example, around 60 GHz are also standardized
(IEEE 802.11ad) but less frequently used. Due to different
propagation characteristics at high frequencies, we discuss
IEEE 802.11ad separately in the mm-wave section (IV-D3).
Different modes of operation are available for Wi-Fi: in-
frastructure, direct, and ad-hoc. The infrastructure mode is
established with a centralized access point (AP), which han-
dles all network traffic from connected stations. The latter
two modes are formed in a peer-to-peer fashion directly by
the devices. While Wi-Fi direct is intended to be applied
in use-cases where ad-hoc Wi-Fi was previously envisaged
9for use, its implementation is very different. The primary
difference is that Wi-Fi direct internally uses the infrastructure
mode, while ad-hoc Wi-Fi remains a separate mode. Because
the specification of ad-hoc Wi-Fi has not been substantially
updated since the 802.11b standard, more recent Wi-Fi security
and performance improvements have not necessarily been
incorporated into ad-hoc Wi-Fi implementations. This would
be of limited concern, were it not for the continued use of
ad-hoc Wi-Fi in certain applications, particularly those where
multi-hop mesh networking is required [90], [91]. While some
technologies now widely adapt Wi-Fi direct [92], [93], the pure
ad-hoc mode is relatively rarely used despite the number of
its advantages.
The data rates of Wi-Fi communication have increased
significantly over the last decade and can exceed 1 Gbit/s
[94]. Wi-Fi coverage varies from 30 to 250 meters [95],
[96] for indoor and outdoor environments respectively. The
5 GHz band has a smaller communication range due to a
shorter wavelength and higher attenuation as compared to 2.4
GHz [97]. Wi-Fi communication is human-imperceptible and
enables omnidirectional transmission with signals propagating
through most non-metal objects such as walls, doors and
windows.
Since Wi-Fi channels are inherently broadcast and have
wide coverage, they are susceptible to a number of threats [49].
Adversaries may, for example, obtain unauthorized access to
intercept transmitted information, inject and modify data in
the air with surgical precision, reroute traffic for analysis with
MITM attacks [50], or efficiently jam the network to cause a
DOS [52], [53]. Such attacks have been shown to be feasible
with low effort [51]. Moreover, due to the widespread use of
Wi-Fi, identity tracking might threaten user privacy [98].
As Wi-Fi chips are ubiquitous and integrated in a wide
range of devices starting from powerful laptops to resource-
constrained sensors, the technology became a de-facto stan-
dard for communication of mobile devices. In the following,
we describe various pairing schemes which utilize the Wi-Fi
channel to accomplish pairing.
Push Button Configuration (PBC) was introduced as a part
of standardized Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) [54] which
incorporates two other pairing schemes known as “Pin Entry”
and “Near Field Communication”. The pairing is initiated
when a user presses a button on one device (enrollee) which
starts searching for a PBC-enabled peer within its range to
complete pairing. Once a button is pressed on the second
device (registrar) an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman (DH) key
exchange is performed via the Wi-Fi channel.
Despite the fact that the PBC pairing scheme is imple-
mented on real devices and provides protection against passive
eavesdroppers, it is inherently vulnerable to active adversaries
who can mount MITM attacks.
Capkun et al. [55] proposed integrity codes (I-codes) a
security mechanism that enables authentication and integrity
protection of messages exchanged over a wireless radio chan-
nel. In order to achieve the stated purpose, I-codes rely on
three components: unidirectional message coding, on-off key-
ing communication, and the ability of the receiver to determine
if the transmitter is within its communication range. The
authors showed that authentication through presence can be
achieved if communicating devices are aware of each other’s
reception distance and are synchronized with respect to the
start of transmission.
Security properties of I-codes were discussed in the pres-
ence of a powerful attacker who has full control over a
wireless channel except for her inability to disable the whole
communication, for example, remove the energy of a signal.
Based on I-codes a new version of the DH protocol was
proposed which was claimed to be optimal in the sense of
transmitted message length and the corresponding security
level.
Gollakota et al. suggested tamper-evident pairing (TEP)
[56], a scheme that utilizes on-off coding to prevent MITM
attacks on the wireless channels. Specifically, the authors
introduced a primitive called Tamper Evident Announcement
(TEA) which completely prevents active attackers from either
changing the content of a transmitted message or hiding the
fact that the message was sent. To achieve the stated goal the
TEA mechanism introduces silence periods. Particularly, the
payload of the TEA message is appended by a sequence of
short equal-sized packets called slots in which the transmitter
chooses to either send data (on-slot) or remain idle (off-slot).
The TEP scheme uses a bit sequence produced by on-off
slots to encode the hash of the TEA payload. In this case,
an adversary might tamper with the off-slots by transmitting
a signal, while she cannot remove energy from the on-slots.
Hence, attackers that have no physical access to the pairing
devices are prevented from tampering with the transmitted
signal, they can neither suppress the communication nor create
a capture effect [99].
2) Bluetooth Channel: Bluetooth is a wireless communi-
cation technology which operates in the 2.4 GHz frequency
band and is used to connect several devices in an ad-hoc
manner, thus forming a personal area network [100]. Typical
data rates for Bluetooth are 1–3 Mbit/s but can reach 24
Mbit/s [101]. Bluetooth coverage varies from 1 to 100 meters
depending on the utilized antennas [57] and can be used in
both indoor and outdoor environments. Physical characteristics
of Bluetooth communication are similar to those of 2.4 GHz
Wi-Fi, therefore it cannot be sensed by humans, achieves
relatively high penetration of solid objects and does not require
LOS for data transmission.
Bluetooth communication is vulnerable to similar security
issues as Wi-Fi, despite the fact that a Bluetooth channel is
more difficult to access due to its shorter range. In addition, at-
tacks to extend over the nominal communication range, obtain
unauthorized data access, or fuzz protocol implementations to
reveal vulnerabilities have been shown to be feasible [57] with
low hardware requirements. Moreover MITM attacks [37], as
well as DOS [57] are as practical as in Wi-Fi.
Currently, low-power Bluetooth chips are pervasive and can
be found in billions of devices. Further, we review a prominent
pairing scheme that relies on the Bluetooth channel.
Secure Simple Pairing [43] proposed by the Bluetooth
SIG is a de facto standard for pairing multiple personal
devices. With a recent security enhancement [18] there are now
four schemes available for Bluetooth pairing: “Just Works”,
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“Numeric comparison”, “Passkey Entry” and “Out-of-band”.
However, only the first scheme solely relies on the Bluetooth
channel to achieve pairing, whereas others utilize HCI or
other PHY channels, for example, Near Field Communication
(NFC), to ensure authenticity.
The Just Works scheme is used to perform pairing with
constrained devices, for example, a headset, which lack con-
venient input/output capabilities such as a keyboard or a
display. In essence, Just Works is based on an unauthenticated
DH key exchange which provides protection against passive
eavesdroppers but is inherently vulnerable to active MITM
attackers [43].
3) mm-Waves Channel: mm-Wave wireless communica-
tions operate in a wide frequency band from 30 to 300 GHz.
The lower part of the mm-Wave spectrum (30–50 GHz) is
considered to be used in cellular and indoor environments with
the coverage of up to 200 meters [102], although high-speed
outdoor point-to-point links can work over longer distances
[103]. At higher frequencies, an unlicensed spectrum around
60 GHz is being standardized (IEEE 802.11ad [104]) and
deemed to be actively used for a great variety of indoor
applications [105].
With mm-Waves very high data rates are possible due
the wide channel bandwidths available. For example, IEEE
802.11ad achieves transmission speed of up to 6.75 Gbit/s
within the coverage area of up to 10 meters [106]. Due to high
attenuation and absorption rates mm-Waves at 60 GHz do not
propagate through solid objects, for example, walls, and the
LOS requirement is imposed on the mm-Wave communication
[107]. Being a part of the microwave spectrum mm-Waves
cannot be perceived by humans.
The plausible properties of mm-Waves such as the short
range, LOS transmission and no wall penetration were claimed
to provide highly secure operation [103]. However, as was
recently shown [58] eavesdropping is possible on a 60 GHz
channel through reflections caused by small-scale objects
located within a transmission beam. At the moment, 60 GHz
chips can only be found in a few commercial products, for
example, [108], but the number of supported devices will
undoubtedly increase in the medium term. Next, we describe
a pairing scheme which uses the mm-Wave channel.
Despite being a relatively new technology, 60 GHz com-
munication has already adopted pairing schemes from the
standardized WPS such as PBC [109]. Nevertheless, the
PBC pairing is susceptible to MITM attacks as stated above.
However, due to the short-range transmission with LOS, an
adversary would have to be co-present, that is, in the same
room, and interfere within a transmission beam in order to
mount such an attack. These actions are much harder to
perform stealthily without a benign user noticing them, which
was not the case for the legacy Wi-Fi PBC.
4) Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) Channel: RFID
is a wireless communication technology which is used for
automatic identification in both indoor and outdoor environ-
ments. That is, an RFID system consists of tags (active
or passive) which store the identification information and
readers that query the tags in order to extract and verify
that information [110]. More ubiquitous passive tags have to
harvest energy from nearby RFID reader’s interrogating radio
waves, whereas active tags have on-board power supply, for
example, a battery.
RFID operates in several frequency bands [110]: Low Fre-
quency (120–150 kHz), High Frequency(13.56 MHz), Ultra-
High Frequency (860–960 MHz), Microwave (2.45 and 5.8
GHz), Ultra-Wide Band (3.1–10.6 GHz). Typical data rates
vary from several to hundreds of kbit/s and depend on the
utilized spectra [111]. The coverage that was reported for the
RFID technology ranges from 10 to 100 meters for passive
and active tags correspondingly [110], [112]. Regardless of the
underlying frequency, RFID communication cannot be sensed
by humans. However, the capability of RFID transmission
to pass through solid objects depends on the used spectrum
as well as the employed antenna and is higher for active
RFID. For sending and receiving data with RFID LOS is
not required.
There are several security concerns regarding RFID com-
munication. First, its wireless nature poses threats similar to
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth which are especially prominent for active
tags operating over longer distances [59]. Second, passive tags
are very constrained devices and can promiscuously respond
to any reader request [113] despite being short-range. It was
shown that RFID channels are vulnerable to eavesdropping,
unauthorized access, relay and DOS attacks [59]–[62]. The
relay attacks on contactless smart cards are especially severe,
as they can easily circumvent security of payment and access
control systems [62], [114], and defending against such relay
attacks is an active research area [113], [115], [116].
RFID tags are presently ubiquitous and can be found in
many applications such as logistics, tracking and access con-
trol [117]. Nevertheless, most consumer devices, for example,
smartphones, are not supplied with built-in RFID chips and
use the NFC technology instead. Several representative pairing
schemes which employ the RFID channel are described below.
Castelluccia and Avoine [63] presented a paring scheme
called Nosy Tags for secure key establishment over a wire-
less RFID channel between a passive tag and a reader. In
essence, the pairing scheme relies on noise injection into a
public communication channel, which makes the actual signal
meaningless for an eavesdropping adversary, but allows the
reader to efficiently restore the original message. This idea is
implemented by introducing an extra RFID tag (a nosy tag)
which belongs to the reader and shares a secret key with it.
The proposed pairing scheme works as follows. When the
reader queries a passive tag within its proximity the nosy
tag generates a sequence of random bits, which prevents
the eavesdropper from differentiating between the original
message sent by the queried tag and the one injected by the
nosy tag. On the reader’s side the generated noise can be
subtracted to recover the actual signal.
The authors provided three variants of their pairing scheme
based on the nosy tags and analyzed its security against
passive attackers. Nevertheless, the pairing scheme can still
be circumvented by active adversaries.
Amariucai et al. [64] suggested Adopted-Pet, an automatic
time-based scheme for pairing a passive RFID tag with a
reader without any human interaction or additional PHY
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channels, for example, NFC. The main idea is as follows.
A tag can reassure that a particular reader is trusted only
if it spends a sufficient amount of uninterrupted time within
the proximity of this reader. Specifically, a tag has to be
interrogated only by a single reader (uninterrupted property)
for a time period during which the tag gradually transmits
pieces of its secret password which are accumulated by the
reader in order to eventually restore the secret.
The authors implemented their pairing scheme using a
linear-feedback shift register and argued that it is robust
against adversaries who can spend numerous interrupted time
intervals in the proximity of a victim tag.
5) NFC Channel: NFC is a wireless communication tech-
nology which is used to establish point-to-point communica-
tion between two devices brought to close proximity. NFC
is an offshoot of RFID technology, thus NFC devices can
similarly be active or passive [118]. NFC operates in 13.56
MHz frequency band and supports data rates of up to 424
kbit/s [66]. NFC has very limited coverage of up to 10
cm [66]. Similarly to RFID, NFC communication cannot be
perceived by humans, is able to penetrate solid object to a
certain degree, and does not require LOS for data transmission.
Initially, security assumptions about NFC were based on
its very short range and, hence, severe difficulty for an
attacker to access it. However, recently it was shown that
eavesdropping on NFC channels is possible at a distance of up
to 240 cm [65]. In addition, unauthorized readings [61] pose
a real threat which can lead to practical relay attacks on the
NFC communications [66]. With the advent of mobile NFC
payments, the relay attacks on such systems have become a
severe security threat [119]–[121], which has not yet been fully
addressed [122], [123].
NFC chips are widely deployed, and can be found in
numerous smartphones and other devices. We present two
pairing schemes which utilize the NFC channel.
Near Field Communication [17] is a pairing scheme from
the standardized WPS mentioned previously. Specifically, the
NFC channel can be used to transmit a hardware generated
password from one device that initiates pairing (enrollee) to
another device (registrar) with which the pairing should be
performed. Another pairing setting available with WPS NFC
is to exchange hashes of public keys between the enrollee
and registrar once they are brought to close proximity, that is,
physical contact.
The security assumptions of WPS NFC are based on the
limited communication range provided by the NFC tech-
nology, which is much more difficult for an adversary to
eavesdrop.
Out-of-band [67] is a pairing scheme provided by standard-
ized Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing. It works as follows.
Once two devices have discovered each other via the Bluetooth
channel, the NFC channel is used to exchange authentication
information, for example, Hash C, Randomizer R or TK-value,
between the devices in order to accomplish pairing.
The security arguments for the Out-of-band scheme rely on
the restricted nature of the NFC communication which cannot
be easily accessed by an attacker.
6) Visible Light Communication (VLC) Channel: VLC is a
wireless communication technology which carries information
by modulating light in the visible spectrum that is used
for illumination [124]. VLC operates in the 400–800 THz
frequency band and is widely considered to be used for indoor
short range communications [124]. The data rates that can be
achieved by the existing standard (IEEE 802.15.7 [125]) vary
from 11.67 kbit/s to 96 Mbit/s [126], although recent research
demonstrated throughput of up to 20 Gbit/s [127]. Typically,
VLC has coverage of up to 10 meters [128] and it is perceived
by humans via the sight sense. VLC transmission requires
LOS and cannot penetrate non-transparent solid objects such
as walls and doors.
Therefore, VLC communication is concealed, to some
extent, from an adversary who is not co-present. However,
recently it was shown that VLC can be efficiently eaves-
dropped by the attacker located outside of the room where
communication happens [68]. Additionally, in [129] it was
discussed that the integrity of a VLC channel can be affected
by an adversary using a directional light source, for example,
a laser.
At present, there are no commercial devices, for example,
smartphones, that support a standardized VLC technology
(IEEE 802.15.7). However, fully functional prototypes [130]
have been recently demonstrated, which makes it feasible that
the VLC-enabled devices will appear on the market soon. In
the following, we review representative pairing schemes that
rely on the VLC channel.
Roman and Lopez [69] studied the applicability of visible
light as OOB in the context of wireless sensor networks
(WSN) where two previously unknown devices want to ex-
change sensitive information. The authors developed a scheme
called KeyLED with which two constrained sensors can pair.
Particularly, two devices located in close proximity utilize a
LED-photosensor pair to set up a short distance communica-
tion channel (few cm) and transmit their public keys using
on-off keying.
The security of the proposed pairing scheme was discussed
with respect to eavesdropping, injection and DOS attacks.
It was claimed that even though such threats are feasible,
mounting them in practice is difficult and a benign user who
initiates communication between two sensors can be easily
alerted in case of the attack.
The similar line of work by Gauger et al. [70] investigated
an ad-hoc key assignment for devices in WSN. The suggested
Enlighten Me! scheme was considered for two application
scenarios: a) initial key assignment as a part of the WSN con-
figuration b) dynamic key re-assignment of already deployed
sensors.
The proposed pairing scheme works as follows. There
is a master device (key sender), which provides a set of
sensors (key receiver) residing within its wireless range with
secret keys using an auxiliary light channel. During the key
assignment procedure, the discovery of a receiving device,
secret transmission and verification is achieved with a light
source-sensor channel using Manchester coding.
The authors implemented two types of key senders: a sensor
node lamp with a powerful LED and a smartphone with a
12
varying brightness level on a display. For both prototypes they
argued that eavesdropping the transmitted key is difficult to
achieve in practice, because the realized VLC channel can be
effectively concealed from an outside observer.
Kovacˇevic´ et al. [71] proposed Flashing displays, two
multichannel deployment schemes for secure initialization
of wireless sensors using only a multi-touch screen of a
smartphone or a tablet as a light source. Particularly, both
schemes utilize two channels: wireless radio and VLC, where
the former is considered as insecure and the latter is used as
OOB.
The first scheme relies on a visible light channel that is
established between a display of a smartphone and a light
sensor of a constrained device once it is put on top of
the screen. In this setting, several constrained devices can
simultaneously receive secret keys which have to be verified
later on over a wireless radio channel.
The second scheme was introduced in order to address
a powerful adversary who can still eavesdrop on the VLC
channel via electromagnetic emissions of a flashing display.
Specifically, the developed mechanism incorporated both the
VLC channel, for synchronization purposes, together with
customized integrity codes [55]. The authors showed that such
a pairing scheme is secure against an attacker who can read
the content of the flashing screen at any moment in time.
7) Visual Channel: A visual channel enables wireless com-
munication in the visible light spectrum (400–800 THz) by
utilizing currently abundant LCD-camera hardware. Such real-
time transmission was shown feasible at 12 Mbit/s within a
distance of 10 meters using large displays and high-speed
digital cameras [131]. Another line of research [132]–[134]
investigated visual communication that can be established
with the LCD-camera found on commodity hardware such as
smartphones. The results indicate that data transmission at 324
kbit/s is possible in the vicinity of 20 cm.
Such visual channels, whose properties include short range
of communications and interference-free operation, were
claimed to provide secure transmission [131], [135]. However,
the fact that an LCD-camera channel can be observed and
easily interpreted by humans comes with a drawback. Specif-
ically, eavesdropping either in a from of shoulder surfing or
ubiquitous CCTV was shown to be a real threat [72], especially
taking into account the continuous increase of display sizes
[136], [137] and recent advances in CCTV [138]. Another
security issue that was raised is related to the “liveness” of
the captured video stream, which can lead to replay attacks
[73].
At present, camera-display peripherals are ubiquitous on
numerous devices such as smartphones. Further, we describe
a pairing scheme based on the visual channel.
Zhang et al. [72] investigated secure bar-code communica-
tion for smartphones. They proposed SBVLC, a novel approach
for secure ad-hoc interactions which can be established via a
short-range LCD-camera channel on mobile devices.
The authors suggested a pairing scheme based on SBVLC
that works as follows. To pair, two parties utilize a full
duplex LCD-camera channel which is realized as a sequence
of QR-codes displayed on the screen of one device and
captured by the camera of another device. Specifically, once
two smartphones are brought to physical proximity, that is,
within a few inches, they start to simultaneously exchange
key material using the described visual channel. Afterwards,
one of the devices randomly picks a universal hash function
which is used to build a shared secret key from the material
accumulated by both parties.
The security of the proposed approach was formally ana-
lyzed against the eavesdropping adversary by employing 2D
and 3D geometric models. In addition, it was shown that
proactive rotation of the devices during pairing can enhance
security, since the attacker is forced to capture frames simulta-
neously from both displays to undermine the pairing scheme.
Moreover, the authors showed that the established key has
enough entropy, that is, cannot be recovered, if the adversary
misses at least one frame during the key exchange, which
further improves security.
8) Infrared Data Association (IRDA) Channel: IRDA is
a set of wireless communication technologies that uses the
infrared radio spectrum 334–353 THz [139] for point-to-point
data transmission. Since IRDA is susceptible to interference
from ambient light sources [140] it is mostly considered for
indoor applications. With the IRDA communication high data
rates of up to 1 Gbit/s [141] are possible. IRDA has coverage
of up to 1 meter, is human-imperceptible and requires direct
LOS.
IRDA was claimed [141] to provide secure data trans-
mission due to its short range, directional operation (a 30◦
beamwidth) and the fact that infrared communication cannot
traverse through solid objects such as walls and doors. How-
ever, such claims cause controversy because with toolkits like
TV-B-Gone [74] a variant of replay attacks can be mounted
over relatively long distances [142]. In addition, the eaves-
dropping attack through reflections recently demonstrated on
VLC [68] can be feasibly applied to the infrared channel since
the two media have very similar physical properties.
Presently, many IRDA-enabled devices can be found in
consumer electronics and household appliances, although such
technology is obsolete on modern smartphones. Nevertheless,
there is a growing number of personal devices supplied with
IR-blasters [143] which indicates the restored interest to the
infrared communication. One such pairing scheme which
makes use of the infrared channel is described next.
Balfanz et al. [7] suggested a pairing scheme known as
Talking To Strangers. The core idea behind was to combine
demonstrative identification from the user perspective, for ex-
ample, two physical devices with which a user interacts, with
location-limited channels that aim to provide data authenticity.
The latter concept denotes exactly the OOB channel.
The basic pairing scheme proposed by the authors works
as follows. First, two devices exchange commitments to their
public keys, that is, hashes, over an IRDA communication
channel which serves as the OOB channel. Second, they
transfer their corresponding public keys over a wireless radio
channel. The wireless communications is verified against the
initial commitment that was transmitted over the infrared
channel. In addition, several other schemes were developed
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upon the basic pairing approach which dealt with constrained
devices and group pairing.
The authors discussed security implications of the proposed
pairing and pointed out that an adversary would have to
actively intercept the OOB channel in order to undermine the
pairing scheme.
9) Audio Channel: Audio is a mechanical pressure wave
caused by periodic vibrations within an audible frequency
range of 20 Hz–20 kHz [144]. An audio channel in this case
would be represented by a speaker-microphone pair, where the
former generates a sound and the latter records it.
The line of research [145]–[148] investigated the throughput
and coverage of the audio channel utilizing different mod-
ulation schemes. The results indicate that with inexpensive
speakers and microphones found on commodity hardware,
such as laptops, data rates can go from 20 bit/s to 4.7 kbit/s
over distances from 19.7 to 3.89 meters respectively. Naturally,
the audio channel can be perceived by humans via the hearing
sense. The audio signal can, to a certain extent, pass through
solid objects, for example, walls, although the penetration
capability very much depends on the used frequency and
environment which determine pass loss factors [149]. For
transmission the audio channel does not require LOS, however,
the signal reception is largely affected by several aspects:
a) intensity of a sound source b) ambient noise c) acoustic
environment d) directionality and sensitivity of a microphone
[150].
With respect to security, eavesdropping was shown to
be easily achievable using off-the-shelf equipment even for
specifically designed short-range sound waves [39]. Moreover,
relay attacks are possible since audio streaming tools are
highly available on mobile devices such as smartphones [75].
Currently, microphones and speakers are pervasive on many
existing platforms ranging from simple sensors to powerful
laptops. We describe several pairing schemes which utilize
the audio channel.
Goodrich et al. [41] suggested an approach to human-
assisted authentication of previously unknown devices using
the audio channel. The developed Loud and Clear (LC) pairing
scheme requires two devices to be equipped with speakers, or
when one device does not have a speaker, it should be supplied
with a display.
The LC pairing consists of two phases and works as follows.
First, both devices exchange their public keys over a wireless
radio channel such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Second, the audio
channel is used to transmit the hashes of public keys encoded
as MadLib sentences which can be verified by the user.
Specifically, in case of both devices having speakers the user
has to confirm the equality of the generated audio sequences.
Whereas, for the speaker-display setting the user needs to
ensure that a sentence played by the first device is similar
to the one displayed on the screen of the second device.
The authors analyzed the security of the LC pairing scheme
and concluded that MITM attacks can be easily detected if the
user is diligent when comparing verification audio sequences.
Soriente et al. [33] proposed a pairing scheme called HA-
PADEP which relies on the audio channel to transmit both
data and verification information between previously unknown
devices.
The HAPADEP pairing scheme consists of two steps and
works as follows. First, both devices exchange their public
keys over the audio channel using the fast codec which allows
higher transmission speed, but makes the signal meaningless
for a user. During the second phase two devices encode the
hash of the exchanged cryptographic material using the slow
codec and play back the sound, for example, a melody or a
MadLib sentence, that can be recognized and verified by the
user. That is, if both audio sequences heard by the user match
then the pairing is considered to be successful.
The authors provided the implementation of the HAPADEP
pairing and conducted a usability study, which revealed that
the scheme was generally accepted by the users. Moreover,
they discussed the resilience of the proposed pairing to MITM,
impersonation and DOS attacks. The HAPADEP scheme was
cryptographically extended in the unified pairing framework
[151] to provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS), which further
increases security against MITM attackers.
Halperin et al. [76] investigated security and privacy impli-
cations in IMD. Specifically, they revealed that communica-
tion between the implant and the medical programmer, used
for the collection of sensitive data and IMD reprogramming,
happened without encryption or authentication. This opened
the door for attacks such as eavesdropping, replay and DOS.
To mitigate the aforementioned threats, the authors proposed
zero-power pairing, which can be applied to batteryless con-
strained devices such as passive RFID tags.
The suggested pairing scheme works as follows. The pro-
grammer initiating pairing sends a RF signal to power the
passive component of the IMD, which, in turn, generates a
session key and broadcasts it as a modulated sound wave that
is recorded by the programmer’s microphone.
The authors reasoned about the security of the proposed
pairing scheme based on two points. First, since the micro-
phone is placed within a few centimeters of a patient’s chest
it can easily receive the audio signal. However, it is very
difficult to obtain the same signal from farther distance without
dedicated hardware equipment. Second, by utilizing the audio
channel for the key exchange, the user is provided with audible
and tactile feedback, which brings her attention to the fact of
pairing.
10) Ultrasound Channel: Ultrasound refers to acoustic
waves that lie within a frequency range above audible sound
(20 kHz–20 MHz) [152]. In this spectrum, frequencies higher
than 250 kHz are strongly absorbed by the air and, thus, mostly
used for medical imaging rather than data transmission [153].
As in case of audio, the ultrasound channel is formed by an
ultrasonic speaker-microphone pair, which are based on the
piezoelectric effect to produce high frequency waves [48].
Similar to audio, the throughput and transmission range of
the ultrasound channel were evaluated in prior work [145]–
[148], [154]. Specifically, data rates can vary from 230 bit/s
to 2 kbit/s at corresponding distances of 11 and 2 meters.
Contrary to audio, the ultrasound communication cannot be
sensed by humans. When propagating through air, the ultra-
sound signal is subject to high reflection and absorption rates
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caused by solid objects, for example, walls, which makes the
ultrasound communication limited to a single room [77]. For
data transmission with ultrasound LOS is not required.
As for security implications, it was shown that a co-
present adversary can eavesdrop and manipulate the ultrasound
channel, although attacker capabilities largely depend on her
position relative to communicating parties [77]. Moreover,
relay attacks can be mounted on the ultrasound channel when it
is used for a distance estimation as a part of the authentication
procedure [77], [78].
At the moment, few end-user devices are supplied with
dedicated ultrasonic chips. However, the lower part of the
ultrasound spectrum can be generated and recorded by non-
specialized hardware present on existing smartphones [155]
and laptops [154]. A pairing scheme that employs the ultra-
sound channel is presented below.
Mayrhofer et al. [79] studied how secure spontaneous
interactions can be established with spatial references. They
developed a pairing scheme that utilizes the ultrasound channel
for initial device discovery and then implicitly for authenticity
verification.
The proposed pairing scheme works as follows. First, two
devices become aware of each other and learn their corre-
sponding distances and relative positions by employing the
ultrasound sensing. Second, both devices perform an unau-
thenticated DH key exchange over a wireless radio channel.
Third, devices authenticate each other by sending a nonce
encrypted with a shared key over a wireless radio channel
and transmitting the plain nonce over the ultrasound channel
using the interlock protocol [156]. Specifically, the nonce value
is split into pieces and each part is transmitted as a delayed
ultrasound pulse to another device, which results in a longer
distance than the previously obtained spacial reference. Thus,
the receiving device can subtract the initially learnt distance
from the received measurement to acquire a part of the nonce
and gradually learn the full nonce.
The authors discussed the security of the pairing scheme
with respect to eavesdropping, relay and MITM attacks. It
was claimed that the suggested pairing can mitigate and detect
those adversaries even if they have access to both radio and
ultrasound channels (assuming a benign user is attentive).
11) Haptic Channel: A haptic channel is formed by low
frequency waves within a range of 40–800 Hz that cause tactile
sensations [157]. For data transmission such a channel can be
represented by a vibrator-accelerometer pair, where the former
generates a set of pulses captured by the latter. Recently, it
was demonstrated that with advanced modulation and coding
schemes, data rates of up to 200 bit/s can be achieved over the
haptic channel using off-the-shelf hardware [158]. Obviously,
haptic communication requires direct physical contact between
the sender and the receiver. By its nature haptic transmission
does not propagate well in the air and cannot pass through
solid objects, for example, walls. Furthermore, haptic com-
munication is human-perceptible and it does not require LOS.
Despite the restricted nature of the haptic channel it was
shown that eavesdropping is possible through acoustic side
channels [39].
The haptic channel realized with a vibration motor and an
accelerometer can presently be found on numerous end-user
devices such as smartphones. Several pairing schemes that use
the haptic channel are presented below.
Saxena et al. [80] proposed a pairing scheme called Vibrate-
to-Unlock which is used to establish a shared secret between
an RFID tag and a smartphone that belong to the same user.
The suggested pairing scheme works as follows. Initially, a
smartphone selects a secret PIN (14-bits) and transmits it as
an on-off coded sequence of vibrations. An RFID tag that is
brought to contact with the vibrating phone records the data
with its accelerometer, decodes the PIN and stores it. After
the enrolling step, two devices share a common secret. Later
on, when an RFID tag is powered once in the vicinity of the
reader it can only be unlocked if a user authenticates herself by
proving the possession of the pre-shared PIN with her phone,
that is, similarly as described above.
The authors claimed that their scheme has a corresponding
security level of the 4-digit PIN prompted at the ATM with
3 attempts. Moreover, they argued that the suggested pairing
can mitigate such attacks as user tracking, impersonation and
ghost-and-leech.
Studer et al. [38] investigated security implications of the
Bump exchange protocol [159] and revealed that it is vulner-
able to MITM attacks. Hence, the authors presented a new
scheme known as Shot to pair two smartphones in a user-
friendly manner.
The Shot scheme uses a server which is considered as an
insecure channel between two devices to be paired and works
as follows. The first device (endorser) hashes its public key and
transmits the truncated version of the hash (80-bits) to another
device (verifier) as a sequence of vibrations. This message
serves as a pre-authenticator and is used by the verifier to
bootstrap communication with the server, that is, as a session
identifier. By utilizing the server two devices exchange their
identities and public keys. With such information at hand, the
verifier can compute the hash of the endorser’s public key and
compare it with the previously sent pre-authenticator. Once
checked the verifier informs the endorser about the success or
failure of the pairing via a binary vibration.
The authors analyzed the security of Shot pairing and
claimed that in can withstand all types of active attacks on the
insecure channel given an adversary cannot inject messages
into the haptic channel.
Anand and Saxena [81] investigated how the previously pro-
posed Vibrate-to-Unlock scheme [80] can be secured against
acoustic side channels [39]. Their approach was to actively
inject noise in order to cloak the acoustic leakage emanating
from the vibrations. The enhanced pairing scheme called Vi-
breaker utilized a built-in speaker of a smartphone to generate
a masking signal, which makes the acoustic side channel
indistinguishable for an eavesdropping adversary. Specifically,
the authors explored white noise and vibration noise, for
example, pre-recorded representation of audio leakage, as
feasible candidates for masking. In this case, the pairing
procedure (Vibrate-to-Unlock) is complemented by an extra
step when a transmitter injects the masking signal during the
PIN transmission through vibrations. The results indicated that
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both types of noise can efficiently conceal the acoustic side
channel even if the attacker applies filtering techniques.
12) Sensing Channel: A sensing channel is used to obtain
information about the ambient environment as well as deter-
mine a device’s location, position and orientation. Recently,
the use of built-in sensors was proposed for authentication
purposes where proximity detection was applied in order
to mitigate relay attacks [31], [60], [160], [161]. There are
several types of sensor modalities that were discussed in prior
research:
• Radio (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth).
• Audio.
• Motion and position (accelerometer, gyroscope, magne-
tometer).
• Location (GPS).
• Physical (temperature, pressure, luminosity, humidity,
etc.).
Radio and audio are used to obtain information about
wireless radio and acoustic channels described above. That
is, with Wi-Fi and Bluetooth antennas signals from APs and
peer devices can be received, while ambient audio can be
captured with a microphone. In case of radio and audio the
sensing range cannot be delimited precisely, because it very
much depends on the receiving antenna or a microphone,
transmitting power and the channel quality.
Motion and position is measured by a set of sensors that
allow a device to detect movement as well as determine
its relative position and orientation [162]. Readings from an
accelerometer, a gyroscope and a magnetometer are easily
affected by user actions and the ambient environment which
makes the measurements obtained by similar sensors within
some distance highly uncorrelated [86].
Location sensing is represented by the GPS system, which
provides the worldwide outdoor positioning within the accu-
racy of several meters [163]. The GPS technology utilizes
several frequency bands such as 1575.42 MHz and 1227.60
MHz for transmission. The data rates available with GPS can
go up to 50 bit/s. The GPS communication requires direct LOS
since the signals cannot easily pass through non-transparent
solid objects such as walls and doors.
Physical sensing is used to capture information about the
surrounding environment such as temperature, pressure, lumi-
nosity, etc. Typically, physical characteristics do not vary too
much within close proximity, but significantly differ for vari-
ous locations, for example, indoor vs. outdoor or neighboring
rooms, etc.
Previously, it was claimed [160] that tampering with the
ambient environment is a hard task in which an adversary
is unlikely to succeed. However, a more recent study [75]
revealed that it is feasible to manipulate readings of different
sensors such as as radio, audio and physical in a controlled
way using off-the-shelf hardware. With regard to motion and
position modalities, it was demonstrated that accelerometer
readings can be reproduced with sufficient precision [38].
This vulnerability stems from the limited accuracy of built-
in sensors and can be further increased in case the attacker
manages to observe specific user actions, for example, shaking
or bumping. As for outdoor location services, such as GPS, it
was shown to be susceptible to attacks such as spoofing and
jamming [83].
Currently, many devices are supplied with sensing capabil-
ities with smartphones having several different ones, although
various physical sensors are still not widely deployed. In the
following, we review a number of pairing schemes which
utilize the sensing channel.
Varshavsky et al. [27] proposed a pairing scheme named
Amigo to authenticate co-located devices without explicit user
involvement. Specifically, they suggested utilizing a common
radio profile which is location and time specific as the indicator
of physical proximity.
The pairing scheme works as follows. First, two devices,
brought to close proximity, perform an unauthenticated DH
key exchange over a wireless radio channel (Wi-Fi). Second,
both devices start monitoring the ambient radio environment
for a short period of time and construct a signature containing
identifiers and signal strength of the packets received during
the snapshot. Finally, two devices exchange their signatures
over a secure channel using a commitment scheme in order to
verify if the received and local measurements match.
The authors analyzed the security of their pairing scheme
and reported that Amigo is resilient to attacks such as eaves-
dropping, MITM and impersonation.
Cai et al. [84] investigated how to establish secure com-
munication between previously unknown devices without any
shared secrets and OOB channels. They proposed a pairing
scheme called Good Neighbor which uses received signal
strength (RSS) between multiple antennas of the same device
(receiver) to differentiate if another device (sender) is nearby
or not. Specifically, if the sender is in close proximity of the
receiver, the RSS values measured by two receiver’s antennas
would be substantially different, which is not the case when the
(malicious) sender is far away irrespective of its transmitting
power.
The suggested pairing scheme relies on the correlation
between the RSS and physical proximity and works as fol-
lows. First, the sending device initiates pairing by requesting
a public key of the receiving device once brought close to
its first antenna. Second, the sender generates a session key
which is encrypted with the receiver’s public key and starts to
repeatedly transmit the session key to the receiver. Meanwhile,
the sender needs to be moved to the second antenna of the
receiver. Finally, the receiver calculates the ratio of the RSS
values obtained from two antennas and checks if the number of
consecutive measurements are above a pre-defined threshold.
The authors evaluated their pairing scheme with respect to
a powerful adversary who can eavesdrop on the wireless chan-
nel, arbitrarily adjust the transmitting power of her devices and
gain knowledge about the location of receiver’s antennas. The
results indicated that the proposed pairing can successfully
mitigate such an attacker.
Pierson et al. [85] proposed Wanda a pairing scheme built
upon Good Neighbor pairing [84] to securely introduce mobile
devices. Conceptually, the “Wand” was realized as a portable
hardware device supplied with two antennas located half
wavelength apart. Similarly to Good Neighbor the scheme
uses signal strength to determine if the Wand and a target
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device are nearby (detect primitive). However, Wanda expands
upon Good Neighbor by utilizing wireless signal reciprocity to
securely transmit data between the Wand and the target device
via the in-band channel (impart primitive).
The proposed pairing scheme works as follows. First, a user
enables the target device, for example, pressing a button, which
starts broadcasting beacon packets and points the Wand to
it. Using the RSS ratio of the received beacons from two
antennas the Wand determines if the target device is in close
proximity. Second, to send a message the Wand encodes it as
a binary string and transfers one bit at a time. Particularly, a
packet transmitted using the closest antenna is considered as
“1”, and “0” if it is sent from the farthest antenna. To decode
the message the target device calculates the average RSS from
all received packets and checks if the RSS of a specific packet
is above or below the average, that is, either “1” or “0”. Finally,
the Wand sends the hash of the transmitted message, which
can be verified by the target device.
The authors evaluated the security of the Wanda scheme
against eavesdropping and malicious packet injection. Their
findings showed that the proposed pairing can withstand both
types of attacks.
Schu¨rmann and Sigg [28] studied how a secure communi-
cation channel can be established between two devices in an
ad-hoc manner by utilizing ambient audio. Specifically, they
proposed a mechanism that uses audio fingerprints obtained by
two devices from the shared ambient environment to derive a
common secret key without exchanging any information about
the captured audio context.
The suggested pairing scheme works as follows. First, two
devices synchronize their clocks by running an NTP-based
protocol. Second, two devices start simultaneously recording
the ambient audio with their local microphones. The obtained
audio fingerprints are very similar but not identical due to
noise and sampling effects. Finally, error correction codes
(Reed-Solomon) are applied to obtain identical codewords
which are mapped to the unique secret key.
The authors analyzed the security of the proposed pairing
scheme with respect to an adversary who is not in the
same context but can eavesdrop, as well as, mount MITM,
DOS and audio amplification attacks. The experimental results
confirmed that such threats can be successfully mitigated.
Miettinen et al. [19] proposed context-based zero-interaction
pairing for IOT devices which can happen without any user
involvement. Specifically, the notion of sustained co-presence
was employed, meaning that two devices would sense the same
context over a substantial period of time if they are in close
proximity.
The proposed pairing scheme works as follows. First, two
devices derive a shared secret key using an unauthenticated
DH key exchange. Second, both devices continuously monitor
ambient audio and luminosity in order to obtain contextual
fingerprints over time. Using these readings two devices can
iteratively evolve the initial secret key and obtain a new secret
key each time two fingerprints are sufficiently similar. Finally,
after a number of successful key evolution steps two devices
can authenticate each other and use the evolved secret key for
secure communication.
The authors discussed the security of the suggested pairing
scheme with regard to an adversary being inside and outside
the same context, as well as, examining context replay attacks.
Their findings implied that the proposed pairing can withstand
both types of adversaries and mitigate the replay attacks.
Jin et al. [86] proposed a pairing scheme called MagPairing
which requires minimum user interaction and, thus, yields
good usability. Particularly, they exploited magnetometer read-
ings of two smartphones brought to close proximity in order
to establish pairing.
The suggested pairing scheme works as follows. First, two
devices are tapped which triggers an authenticated DH key
exchange during which both devices measure magnetic fields
with their sensors. Second, two devices securely exchange
their magnetometer readings via the interlock protocol [156].
Finally, both devices can authenticate each other by comparing
if the received and local measurements match.
For security analysis, the authors considered attacks such
as eavesdropping, MITM, replay and reflection. The results
revealed that MagPairing is immune to the mentioned threats
even if a powerful active adversary is within a few centimeters
from the pairing devices.
Wang et al. [21] suggested a pairing scheme known as
Touch-And-Guard (TAG) for associating a wearable and an-
other nearby device by utilizing resonant properties of a human
hand. Specifically, a shared secret is obtained from a hand
touch using vibration motors and accelerometers.
The proposed pairing scheme works as follows. First, a user
initiates pairing by touching a target device, for example, a
payment terminal, with the hand on which a wristband is
worn. Second, the target device generates vibrations which
excite both the device itself and the hand. At this point, both
the wearable and the target device record vibrations with their
accelerometers. Finally, both devices process their accelometer
data separately without exchanging it, in order to extract
reciprocal information to eventually generate a shared secret.
The security of the TAG scheme was empirically evaluated
against an eavesdropper acting via acoustic side channels.
It was shown that the proposed pairing can withstand such
attackers even if they are located in proximity. However,
the authors pointed out that the TAG scheme can still be
susceptible to advanced visual eavesdroppers who utilize high-
speed cameras.
E. Discussion
The results of our survey on PHY channels reveal interest-
ing details. First, the literature makes it clear that there are
no known confidential channels, despite considerable efforts
having been invested in pursuit of this goal. Second, at the time
of writing, the most promising communication channels, in
terms of security, were not present in the majority of devices.
Third, the use of sensors to obtain a shared context has recently
been proposed as a new approach for SDP, however it is
not without challenges. We expand on these points in the
following.
1) There are no Confidential Channels: Confidentiality
cannot be guaranteed by any of the PHY channels surveyed,
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even though this appears to be an explicit or implicit assump-
tion in a number of pairing schemes. As shown in Table I, all
PHY channels that we studied are vulnerable to eavesdropping
attacks, and those attacks have been successfully mounted in
the past. Hence, none of these channels provides a secure
transmission medium on its own.
The problem here is two-fold. First, the probability of “off-
the-shelf” eavesdropping, that is, performed without special-
ized equipment, has increased tremendously since numerous
smart devices nowadays are equipped with various peripherals,
for example, cameras, microphones, etc., and the sensing
capabilities of commodity hardware continue to grow [164].
Second, as indicated by Halevi and Saxena [39] side channels
pose a real threat because they can completely circumvent the
security of the pairing scheme. Specifically, they showed that
three pairing schemes (Zero-power pairing [76], Vibrate-to-
unlock [80] and BEDA [32]), which assumed confidentiality
of the OOB channel were successfully broken by exploiting
acoustic side channels.
The importance of side channels as a vital security issue
has been recognized by the research community and addressed
in recent communication systems [158] and pairing schemes
[21], [81]. Nevertheless, new sources of sensitive information
leakage are being continuously discovered [165], which raises
a fundamental question whether it is feasible to identify and
tackle all hidden channels in modern systems. Therefore, we
argue that confidentiality of the PHY channel is very hard
to achieve and guarantee in practice. Correspondingly, this
property should be treated with a great deal of attention when
a PHY channel is considered as a candidate for the OOB
channel.
Regardless of this state of affairs where it is questionable
that confidential channels are possible in practice, pairing
schemes continue to be proposed that rely on secrecy of data
transmission, for example, [166].
2) Most Potentially Secure Channels Missing From Current
Commodity Hardware: The physical characteristics of various
PHY channels provide different security properties. We have
identified an important trade-off between security and ease of
adoption. That is, a number of newer communication channels,
such as mm-Waves and VLC can offer improved security,
however they are not yet ubiquitous.
In particular, mm-Waves and VLC possess valuable security
characteristics. Their short-range of communications, together
with LOS requirements and low penetration rates, make them
ideal for deployment and use as OOB channels in the IOT
domain. Research is, however, still ongoing to improve on
both mm-Waves [107] and VLC [128] communications. A
further advantage is that both technologies can be efficiently
implemented on constrained devices. For example, the anten-
nas required for mm-Wave transmission are very small, and
the VLC building blocks such as diodes and photosensors are
inexpensive. Hence, these technologies are worth considering
for SDP.
The challenge lies in the maturing of these newer channels,
such that they become widely available on commodity hard-
ware. This requires the action on both researchers and vendors.
3) Using Environment Sensing: A different approach to
pairing is to utilize the sensing channel to obtain the shared
context, which can be used either as an indicator of physical
proximity, or as an entropy source to derive a shared secret
key. The use of sensing information enables scalable pairing,
which is crucial in a distributed and diverse environment such
as the IOT. It also reduces or eliminates the user effort, which
results in more usable and less error-prone pairing.
For example, the use of physical environment sensing [161]
and GPS data [167], as it widely explored in schemes such as
zero-interaction authentication (ZIA), can provide a suitable
base to increase security in device pairing as well. The
key insights provided by ZIA both those that are security-
enhancing, such as fusing multiple sensing modalities [31], as
well as those that are adversarial, such as context-manipulation
threats [75], should also be taken into account in SDP.
Channel state information (CSI) in radio communications
provides a different use for sensing. Reciprocal radio channels,
meaning that the same antenna is used for transmitting and
receiving, lead to correlated channel observations at both
sides of a communication link. This correlation of channel
observations allows the transmitter and receiver to obtain a
common fingerprint of the radio environment, that can in turn
be used to mitigate various types of attacks, including MITM
and relay attacks.
Pairing schemes such as Amigo [27], Good Neighbor [84],
and Wanda [85] and also [166], [168]–[174] rely on such
information to ensure that both pairing devices communicate
over the same channel. However, the robustness of such
channel fingerprinting schemes against spoofing is still an
open question under investigation. For example, Zafer et al.
[175] have demonstrated an active CSI spoofing attack. Hence,
pairing schemes leveraging the radio channel must account for
manipulated and forged channel states.
Environment and channel sensing can provide an additional
layer of verification. However, it still suffers from similar
security limitations as PHY channels. Therefore, the sensing
channel cannot, by itself, guarantee that no one is intermediat-
ing communications between the pairing devices, for example,
through an MITM attack.
In this section, we have investigated and discussed PHY
channels along with the SDP schemes utilizing them. In the
next section, we review HCI channels and the corresponding
pairing schemes.
V. HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION CHANNELS
Modern information and communication technologies have
become an indispensable part of the human society. The
way people live, work and interact with each other and the
environment has changed significantly with the advent of smart
devices, social networking and cloud-based services. Various
research and technologies have utilized HCI to provide secu-
rity in a wide range of applications such e-commerce, home
automation, and social networking [176]–[178]. With the up-
coming IOT the importance of developing socially compatible
security tools based on HCI is becoming more evident [179],
[180]. However, relying on human interactions to achieve
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security often introduces vulnerabilities to the system. Bruce
Schneier [181] emphasized the relevance of the human factor
in the system as follows: “... security is only as good as it’s
weakest link, and people are the weakest link in the chain.”
Hence, the security of the system where a user is involved
depends not only on the technical aspects of the system, but
also on how people understand and use it, in addition to the
system’s capability to mitigate threats and issues introduced
by users themselves [176], [182], [183]. From the pairing
perspective, a user also plays an important role with regard
to security. Traditionally, the security of pairing schemes has
involved an aspect of human supervision, which can take the
form of perception, for example, image comparison [184],
decision making, for instance, pressing a button [32], and other
interactive techniques, for example, drawing a pattern [185].
We start our discussion by identifying three points which
are the base for rigorous HCI investigation. In particular, we
specify several types of HCI channels which have been used
in SDP and denote two sets of properties, namely security
properties and usability properties being studied. Afterwards,
we review existing pairing schemes that rely on various
HCI channels to exhibit the trade-offs between security and
usability. Finally, we discuss the most significant insights and
implications, presented in Table II, that were identified in our
survey on HCI channels.
A. HCI Channels in Device Pairing
Recently, numerous devices with rich input/output capabil-
ities and considerable processing power have become widely
available, which has significantly improved the quality of HCI
[177]. Correspondingly, many pairing schemes proposed up-
to-date rely on some form of user involvement. Chong et
al. [13] surveyed existing pairing schemes by considering
user actions required to establish a secure channel between
two devices. We refine their findings to obtain fine-grained
categories of user interaction that have been used in SDP.
Specifically, we define three HCI channels that fully sat-
isfy our definition given in Section III-B: Data relay, Data
comparison and Data generation. In addition, we consider
Device handling, which while not a conventional HCI channel,
represents a more passive form of user interaction that is often
(implicitly) present in device pairing:
1) Data Relay: A channel where a user is prompted to
transfer data generated by one pairing device onto another
pairing device.
2) Data Comparison: A channel where a user is required to
compare and analyze data produced by two pairing devices,
for example, to verify the correctness or consistency of the
information.
3) Data Generation: A channel where a user provides
common input to both pairing devices simultaneously, for
example, shaking, drawing, or first imposes (secret) input on
one device and then provides it again on a second device.
4) Device Handling: A form of user interaction where a
human actor is required to bring pairing devices in proximity,
make physical contact, align them, or take similar action.
B. Security Properties
The security properties of the pairing schemes based on
HCI channels are quite different from the ones purely relying
on PHY channels. First, users are the unavoidable source of
errors [183], [186] and their behavior, as well as, attitude
towards security sensitive tasks can vary significantly [182].
Second, user interaction is subject to observation by both an
internal participant, who is curious, and an external adversary,
who is malicious. To compile the list of representative security
properties we combined issues that have been raised in the
pairing community with respect to human factors [187], [188]
and complemented them with the implications found in the
authentication domain [189]:
1) Inattentive User: Defines if a pairing scheme has certain
tolerance to mistakes and errors introduced by the user. In
particular, a pairing mechanism that does not verify user
input for errors or provide corresponding feedback can be
circumvented by the attacker who can impersonate a legitimate
device.
2) Rushing Behavior: Specifies if a pairing scheme ac-
counts for rushing users who are willing to skip certain steps
of the pairing procedure or accept specific conditions without
verification, in order to speed up pairing.
3) Consent Tampering: Determines if a pairing scheme is
resilient to consent tampering by a dishonest user. That is,
if the user can accept pairing even if the data exchanged
between two devices mismatch, or conversely, reject pairing,
even though both devices successfully establish a connection.
4) User Observation: Defines if a pairing scheme is re-
sistant to an adversary who can observe user actions during
the pairing process. In other words, the attacker does not
benefit from learning user interactions, including (secret) data
exchanged on the HCI channel, and cannot compromise
pairing with such information at hand.
5) Forward Secrecy: Determines how resilient a pairing
scheme from a cryptographic perspective to an eavesdropper
who can leverage user observation and the compromise of the
long-term keys. That is, if the underlying cryptographic pro-
tocol used in the pairing scheme mitigates brute-force offline
attacks aided by (secret) data observed on the HCI channel,
and restricts an adversary to a one-off (online) guessing game.
We evaluate this property under the assumption that DH keys
used by the underlying cryptographic protocols are ephemeral.
6) Honest-but-curious: Specifies if a pairing scheme is sus-
ceptible to an honest-but-curious adversary who legitimately
participates in the pairing process but tries to learn or infer
more information about another pairing party.
C. Usability Properties
As mentioned previously, usability of pairing schemes has
been a subject in several studies and a number of works
investigated how usability can be enhanced in case of device
pairing [202]–[204]. However, many works applied mostly
quantitative metrics to evaluate usability such as completion
time and error rate [8] which are implementation dependent.
In addition, subjective characteristics such as personal prefer-
ences vary with context, as has been previously demonstrated
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SUMMARY OF HCI CHANNELS
Pairing Scheme HCI Channel Security Properties Usability Properties
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MANA I [190]  − − − # # # # # # # # H# H#  H#  
MANA II [190] −  − − # # # # # # #   #  #  
MANA III [190] − H#  − # # # #  # #  # H#    
Access point authentication [191] −  − − # # # #  #    # # # H#
Shake Them Up! [192] − − −   #  # # # # H#    # #
Shake Well Before Use ShaVE [193] − −      H#    H# H#    H#
Shake Well Before Use ShaCK [193] − −    H#  H# #   H# #    H#
SAPHE [194] − −      H# #   H# #    H#
Authentication using ultrasound [195] −  −  # # # H# # # #   # # # H#
Beep - Blink [34] −  − − # # # H#  #    # # H# H#
Blink - Blink [34] −  − − # # # H#  # H#   # H# # H#
RhythmLink [196] − −  − H# H#  # # # # # #  H#  #
Seeing-Is-Believing [197]  − −  H# H# H# H# H# H# H# #   H#   
Visible Laser Light [198] − − −   # # #  # #   H# #  #
VIC (mutual authentication) [199] −  −  # # # H# H# H# #   # H#   
BEDA (B2B) [32] − −  −  H#  #  #   #   # #
BEDA (D2B, SV2B, LV2B) [32]  − − −    #  #  #   H# # #
Playful Security [188]  − − −     − #  #     H#
Safeslinger [200] −  H# −     # H# #   H#  H# H#
Synchronized Drawing [185] − −   H# H# H# #     #   # H#
Proximity Authentication [201] − −   H#   H#  H#   #   # H#
Checksum Gestures [20]  − − H#    H#  H#  #    H# H#
 -= fulfills property; H#-= partly fulfills property; #-= does not fulfill property; −-= n/a
[35]. Thus, there is a lack of a common baseline approach
which would allow usability evaluation of pairing schemes
more qualitatively and coherently. We aim to remedy that
situation by presenting a set of usability properties, which
we derived by studying the usability implications in gen-
eral human-device interaction [26], as well as, authentication
techniques [189] and projecting the findings onto the pairing
domain:
1) Effortless Initialization: Defines minimal user effort
during the discovery phase of the pairing process. For example,
a user is not required to provide any additional information,
such as a number of participants, or pre-configure devices prior
to pairing.
2) No Secret Relay: Does not prompt users to transfer any
(secret) information from one pairing device to another or if it
is required the length of the relayed data should be minimal.
3) Automatic Secret Generation: Specifies that the data
used for authentication, for example, cryptographic keys, is
generated by pairing devices without requiring any user input
or assistance, such as shaking, drawing, etc.
4) Automatic Consistency Check: Determines user effort
necessary for verifying that information exchanged between
pairing devices is similar.
5) Environmental Insensitivity: Defines applicability of the
pairing schemes with respect to the ambient environment. For
example, a pairing scheme may lead to high error rates or
even fail if the environment is too noisy, crowded or has poor
illumination.
6) Explicit User Feedback: Specifies if a pairing scheme
provides meaningful feedback to the user during and upon the
completion of the pairing process. For example, two pairing
devices can indicate success by making an appropriate sound,
and provide explanatory, actionable, feedback if pairing fails.
7) Familiarity: Determines if the user actions imposed by
the pairing scheme correspond to the daily user experience
[35], [176]. That is, if a pairing scheme relies on well-
established interaction patterns, for example, smartphone us-
age, and requires no extra training for an average user in order
to be adopted.
D. Survey of HCI Channels
In this section we review representative pairing schemes
which rely on HCI by focusing on the properties given above.
1) MANA: Gehrmann et. al. [190] presented several
MANual Authentication (MANA) schemes for authenticating
DH public keys. They assumed that devices have at least one
input and/or output interface, for example, a display and/or a
keypad. From the user perspective, a human operator plays a
crucial role in pairing. Three variants of the MANA scheme
were proposed which work as follows:
• MANA I: One device has a display and a simple input
interface, for example, a button, while another device has
a keypad and a simple output interface, for instance, an
LCD panel. The first device computes a random key and a
checksum value and displays this data. The user reads the
checksum value and the random key from the screen of
the first device and inputs this information into the second
device. Then, the second device computes the checksum
value using the provided random key and compares
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the two checksums. The outcome of the comparison is
indicated as an accept or reject message to the user.
Finally, the user enters the result back into the first device.
• MANA II: Both devices have a display but neither of
them a keypad, although they are supplied with a simple
input interface, for example, a button. Similar to MANA
I, the first device computes the random key and the
checksum and displays two values. In addition, the first
device sends the random key to the second device over an
insecure channel, for example, wireless radio. Afterwards,
the second device computes the checksum value and
outputs it together with the key. By comparing values
displayed by both devices a user has to either accept the
connection if they are equal or reject it otherwise.
• MANA III: Both devices are assumed to have a keypad.
The user enters a short random bit-string R into both
devices. Then, each device generates a random message
authentication code (MAC) key and calculates a MAC
value over R concatenated with a device identifier and
the DH-public keys. Afterwards, both devices exchange
their corresponding MAC values via a wireless radio
channel. Only upon receiving the MAC value from the
pairing peer each device reveals its MAC key. Finally,
both devices verify the received MAC values and indicate
the result to the user who is required to compare and
confirm it. A simpler variant exists in case one of the
devices has only a display, that is, no means of input.
The authors argued that MANA-schemes are robust against
MITM attacks, given user diligence in verifying calculated
hash values.
2) Access point authentication: Roth et. al. [191] suggested
a pairing scheme to protect the connection between an AP and
a client device against evil twin attacks.
The proposed pairing scheme uses short authentication
strings (SAS) for key establishment and consists of two
phases. In the setup phase, both devices exchange their public
keys and a nonce value over an insecure wireless channel.
During the authentication phase, a user is required to compare
a certain number of color sequences (minimum two) in order
to verify that pairing was performed with the intended AP. In
detail, each sequence is comprised of two colors and represents
a SAS. Both devices display the sequence of colors, that is,
one color at a time, and the user has to verify their equality
by pressing a button and proceeding to the next sequence. The
number of sequences shown depends on the desired level of
security and eventually the user is prompted to either accept
or reject pairing.
The authors discussed the security of the proposed pairing
scheme and concluded that it can withstand evil twin attacks.
3) Shake Them Up!: Castelluccia et al. [192] proposed a
pairing scheme for CPU-constrained devices, for example,
sensors, that do not have enough computational power to
perform public key cryptography.
The proposed pairing scheme utilizes the anonymous broad-
cast channel and works as follows. In order to derive a
shared secret key, two devices are held together and shaken,
either by a single user, or by two users in close proximity.
Meanwhile, both devices broadcast empty packets over an
insecure wireless channel. The anonymous broadcast implies
that each device sends a packet by setting its own identifier or
the identifier of the pairing peer as the source of the message.
In this case, an adversary can read the transmitted packets but
cannot distinguish the source. In contrast, each pairing device
knows if it has sent a particular message or not, which is
interpreted by the device as a secret bit 1 or 0, and the shared
key can be obtained by observing a pre-defined number of
packets. The shaking is done to thwart signal strength analysis
by an attacker to identify the actual sender.
The authors analyzed the security of their pairing scheme
against an adversary who can read all packets but cannot dis-
tinguish the source of the packet and reported that it is resilient
against MITM and DOS attacks. However, Rasmussen et. al.
[205] showed the vulnerability of this scheme by using radio
fingerprinting to identify the sender.
4) Shake Well Before Use: Mayrhofer et al. [193] suggested
a pairing approach which utilizes accelerometer data generated
from distinct movement patterns. Specifically, they proposed
two schemes to securely pair devices where a user is required
to hold them together and them shake simultaneously.
The first scheme (ShaVE) uses the DH key exchange to
derive a shared key over an insecure wireless channel followed
by the exchange of accelerometer readings via the interlock
protocol [156] to verify authenticity of pairing devices.
The second scheme (ShaCK) relies on the data captured by
the accelerometer to derive a shared secret key. In detail, two
devices hash their synchronized feature vectors obtained from
the sensor readings and accumulate them until the entropy is
sufficient to produce the shared secret key.
The authors discussed the security of the proposed pairing
with regard to an active adversary and concluded that both
schemes can withstand MITM attacks. However, they con-
ceded that the ShaCK variant does not provide forward secrecy
and is vulnerable to offline guessing attacks.
5) SAPHE: Groza and Mayrhofer [194] proposed a pairing
scheme based on shaking, which improved upon the previ-
ous works, for example, ShaCK [193], by devising a more
lightweight approach to securely exchange low entropy vectors
obtained from accelerometer data.
The suggested pairing scheme employs a hashed heuristic
tree and works as follows. First, the commitments between
two devices are exchanged in the form of hashes of randomly
generated values. Second, accelerometer data produced by
shaking two devices together is recorded and used to obtain
a unique secret key on each device. The unique secret keys
are extracted by comparing the accelerometer readings to the
threshold values obtained from the initial commitments by
means of the Euclidian distance. The key extraction algorithm
relies on a hashed heuristic tree, which is essentially a search
tree, where the accelerometer readings are first sorted in
a descending order with respect to the distance from the
threshold values, and then bit-by-bit hashing is applied to
retrieve the unique secret key. Third, both devices exchange
challenges which are nonces encrypted with the individual
secret keys, and each device proofs the possession of the peer’s
key by verifying the challenge.
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The authors analyzed the security of the proposed pairing
scheme and claimed that their approach provides better re-
silience to MITM attackers, who try to guess the low entropy
vectors obtained from accelerometer data. However, the au-
thors conceded that further research is required to evaluate
resilience of the SAPHE scheme against the adversaries who
can observe user interaction.
6) Authentication using Ultrasound: Kindberg et. al. [195]
presented a pairing scheme which utilized ultrasound to phys-
ically validate two devices and establish a secure channel
between them.
The proposed pairing scheme consists of two phases and
works as follows. In the locate phase, a user selects a target
device to communicate with, and makes sure that her personal
device (client) is in LoS with the target. Then the client
sends a message to locate the target, which replies with its
designated identifier, for example, network address, over RF
and ultrasound channels. The client receives those messages,
matches the identifier and is able to calculate the approximate
distance to the target device, which is displayed to a user
for verification. During the associate phase, the user points
the client device to the target and initiates pairing. The target
device replies with the RF message containing its public key
together with a random number and simultaneously emits
the ultrasound message with the same random number. Upon
receipt, the client checks if random numbers from RF and
ultrasound messages match and asks the user to confirm
the relative position of the target device. Finally, the client
encrypts a session key with the target’s public key and sends
it along with a random number back to the target.
The authors argued that the proposed pairing scheme is
robust against various spoofing and replay attacks given the
adversary is unable to counterfeit ultrasound messages.
7) Synchronized Audio-Visual Patterns: Prasad and Saxena
[34] presented two pairing schemes suitable for devices with
only basic interfaces such as a pair of LEDs and/or speakers.
Specifically, both schemes rely on SASs transmitted by two
devices in the form of synchronized audiovisual patterns, for
example, blinking LEDs, which have to be compared by a user
for equality.
In the first scheme (blink-blink) two devices encode their
SASs as sequences of blinking LEDs and the user is required
to compare these sequences and determine if they are syn-
chronous on both devices, for example, green or red LEDs.
In the second scheme (beep-blink) one device transmits its
SAS as a sequence of blinking LEDs, while another device
encodes the SAS as a series of beeping sounds and silence
periods. The user has to verify if these two patterns match,
such as the LED light corresponds to the sound.
The authors analyzed the security of the proposed pairing
with regard to a MITM adversary and concluded that both
schemes can withstand such attacks, yet security depends on
user diligence when comparing two audiovisual sequences.
8) RhythmLink: Lin et. al. [196] proposed a pairing scheme
based on rhythm tapping.
Initially, a user inputs a song rhythm several times on her
personal device, for example, a smartphone, to provide some
training data and eventually obtain a tapped password, referred
to as a tapword. Afterwards, this generated tapword is stored
on the user device and used further for pairing.
To pair with a target device, the user inputs the same tapped
rhythm into it. Therefore, the target device can compute a
tapword and compare it with the pattern stored on the user
device by means of the Euclidean distance. The protocol
uses elliptic curve cryptography to calculate the Euclidean
distance between the tapwords, without either device revealing
its tapword. To generate a session key, password authenticated
key exchange is used in order to avoid MITM attacks. A
device encrypts its model information with this session key
and sends the encrypted data to the other device, which
decrypts this information and computes the Euclidean distance.
Afterwards both distances are compared. If the distances
match, the devices accept pairing.
9) Seeing-Is-Believing (SiB): McCune et. al. [197] pro-
posed a pairing scheme, based on taking a snapshot of a two-
dimensional barcode displayed on the screen of one device by
the camera of another device. The two-dimensional barcodes
are generated by the devices automatically without any human
effort. A user is required to configure the camera and take the
snapshot of the 2-D barcode.
To perform pairing, one device sends its public key to an-
other device over an insecure channel, for example, WiFi, and
displays a two-dimensional barcode. This barcode represents
a visual encoding of the public key sent over the insecure
channel. The second device, supplied with the camera, takes
a snapshot of the barcode and runs a barcode recognition
algorithm in order to process the image and extract the public
key. Afterwards, this device compares the data obtained from
the barcode with the data received over the insecure channel.
If they match, the second device can trust the first device.
The barcode-scanning procedure has to be executed by both
devices for bidirectional authentication.
The security assumption made by this pairing scheme is that
mounting active attacks is difficult without being detected. The
authors further analyzed the security of their pairing scheme
against passive attacks and proposed to additionally use the
DH session key exchange protocol to protect against brute-
force attacks.
10) Visible Laser Light: Mayrhofer et. al. [198] described a
pairing scheme based on visible laser light for personal mobile
devices equipped with a laser diode. These personal devices
interact with another remote device, which is able to detect
the laser light.
The proposed pairing scheme works as follows. First, a user
presses a button and turns on the laser on the personal device.
This causes the device to begin continuously transmitting
messages. When the remote device detects these messages,
it generates a response and broadcasts it over a wireless radio
channel. Second, both devices start a key agreement protocol,
and the target turns on a LED to identify itself. Third, if
the LED is activated on the target device expected by the
user, she presses a second button triggering an autonomous
phase. During the autonomous phase the derived secret key is
verified by sending a series of cryptographic challenges via
the wireless radio channel, and requiring that the responses to
the challenges to be transmitted via the laser.
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The authors evaluated their pairing scheme in the face of an
active adversary attempting to mount a MITM attack. They
reported that the attack would only succeed if the adversary
can compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the laser
and wireless radio channels at the same time.
11) Visual authentication based on Integrity Checking
(VIC): Saxena et. al. [199] improved the SiB pairing scheme
by providing mutual authentication between devices to be
paired using only a unidirectional visual channel, that is,
requiring that only one of the two devices has a camera, instead
of both.
The proposed pairing scheme employs short authenticated
integrity checksums for key agreement and works as follows.
First, each pairing device exchanges its public data, a public
key and a random bit string, over an insecure channel. Second,
each device calculates a checksum, in practice a cryptographic
hash-function, over this public data, that is, both public keys
and random bit strings. Third, one of the devices sends
its results to the other device using the visual channel for
comparison, that is, the second device uses its camera to read
the 2-D barcode displayed by the first device. Fourth, the
second device compares the hash transmitted over a display-
camera channel by the first device with the locally computed
value. If the two values match, the second device accepts the
connection, and displays a confirmation message to the user.
Finally, the first device prompts the user to indicate if the
second device accepted the connection or not.
The authors discussed the security of their pairing scheme
and indicated that it is resilient to MITM attacks, only if the
hash function used in the scheme is collision-resistant.
12) BEDA: Soriente et. al. [32] investigated how to pair
devices with very limited interface capabilities such as a single
button. They proposed a pairing scheme which first performs
a DH key agreement and then executes the pairing procedure
to authenticate the DH public keys.
The suggested pairing scheme consists of two phases and
works as follows. In the first phase, a short 21-bit secret is
distributed between the devices with user assistance. Depend-
ing on the available hardware interfaces this initial secret can
either be obtained via the user input provided to both devices
(Button-to-Button) or by relaying the data generated by one
device to another device (Display-, Short Vibration-, Long
Vibration-to-Button). In the second phase, the authenticity of
the exchanged public key is incrementally verified in a 21-
round procedure by using the initial secret.
The security of the proposed pairing depends on the con-
fidentiality of the channel. The authors discussed that their
pairing scheme is secure against MITM attacks only if the
data exchanged between the devices cannot be eavesdropped.
The BEDA scheme was cryptographically extended in the
unified pairing framework [151] to provide PFS, which further
increases security against MITM attackers.
13) Playful Security (Alice says): Gallego et. al. [188]
proposed a pairing scheme based on the memory game Simon.
The suggested scheme uses SASs computed by each device
individually, and a user is required to transmit these strings
from one device to the another device.
The proposed pairing scheme works as follows. One device
displays several audiovisual patterns and the user relays these
patterns to another device supplied with the input interface.
The first pattern consists of a single color and tone that
encodes the first two bits of the SAS. For the next round
two bits will be concatenated to the first pattern. This data
forms a new pattern that needs to be similarly transmitted
by the user. This iterative process continues until a sufficient
number of bits have been successfully exchanged between two
devices. If an error occurs in a round, a new pattern will be
concatenated with the previous patterns that were exchanged
successfully. To avoid synchronization issues the first device is
equipped with two buttons. If an error occurs, the user selects
previous button to repeat the exchange of the SASs between
the devices.
The authors argued that the proposed pairing scheme is
robust to human errors and, therefore, can mitigate MITM
attacks caused by such errors.
14) Safeslinger: Farb et. al. [200] presented a pairing
scheme for data exchange with smartphones. That is, users
upon a physical encounter can initiate the exchange of their
public keys, as well as, selected contact information and
communicate securely afterwards. The SafeSlinger scheme
is built upon two cryptographic mechanisms, namely multi-
value commitments and group DH key agreement. The pairing
scheme requires active user interaction, which includes enter-
ing the number of participating devices, selecting the data to
be exchanged, and finally, comparing a 3-word phrase which
has to be commonly chosen by all users.
The authors analyzed the security of their pairing scheme
and argued that SafeSlinger mitigates attacks such as MITM,
group-in-the-middle, impersonation and sybil attacks, by in-
volving the user in the security chain and accounting for user
misbehavior.
15) Synchronized Drawing: Sethi et. al. [185] presented a
pairing scheme based on physical proximity and commitment-
based cryptographic primitives.
The proposed pairing scheme consists of four phases and
works as follows. In the first phase, two devices attempt to
establish a shared secret using DH or a similar protocol over
an insecure channel. In the second phase, fuzzy secrets are
extracted from user input produced by simultaneously drawing
the same pattern with two fingers of the same hand, for
example, a thumb and index finger, on two touchscreens or
surfaces of two devices to be paired. In the third phase, each
device sends an unencrypted commitment message to another
device, which contains a hash of: (a) the device’s identifier,
(b) the fuzzy secret derived from the drawing, (c) a random
number, and (d) the DH-shared key. In the fourth phase, each
device encrypts its random number and fuzzy secret obtained
in the third phase using the shared secret calculated in the first
phase.
By carefully ensuring that both devices complete the third
phase before entering the fourth phase, authors argued that
MITM attacks can be prevented.
16) Proximity Authentication: Li et. al. [201] presented
a pairing scheme which uses proximity to perform mutual
authentication between two devices without using NFC chips.
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The suggested pairing scheme works as follows. First, a
user draws a zigzag pattern simultaneously on both devices to
be paired, using two fingers of the same hand. Second, each
device individually derives a set of common features obtained
from the drawing. Third, the private set intersection approach
[206] is applied to the feature vectors of both devices in order
to generate a shared secret key.
The authors discussed security implications of their pairing
scheme and claimed that it is secure against dictionary and
MITM attacks.
17) Checksum Gestures: Ahmed et. al. [20] proposed a
pairing scheme based on SASs, where a continuous gesture
is required for encoding authentication information.
The suggested pairing scheme works as follows. First, the
user and target devices execute a key exchange protocol based
on SASs to obtain a checksum string (at least 20 bits) stored
on both devices. Second, the user device transforms this
checksum string into a motion pattern, which is displayed to
the user, who is required to reproduce this motion pattern as
a continuous gesture on the target device. Third, the input
gesture is captured and processed by the target device, which
then compares the obtained data with the motion pattern
derived locally from the shared checksum string. If both
match, the unidirectional communication channel is authen-
ticated between the user and target devices. The security of
the proposed pairing scheme is based on the feasibility of
gesture recognition technologies, particularly in maintaining
sufficiently low false-positive and false-negative error rates.
The authors analyzed the security of their pairing scheme
based on the probability of interpreting a false input of an
attacker as a correct gesture and reported that the probability
of success of a relay attack is under 5.5%.
E. Discussion
The results of our HCI study are summarized in Table II,
from which we identify and discuss four key points which have
important security and usability implications for SDP. First,
we identify an important trade-off that exists between passive
and active HCI channels. Second, the significance of usability
properties, including the provision of explicit user feedback
and insensitivity of HCI input to environmental conditions
is considered. Third, security issues resulting from various
forms of intentional and unintentional, as well as, benevolent
and malicious user misbehavior are explored. Finally, the vital
problem of observation threats for HCI channels is presented,
that is, the situation where an attacker can observe and exploit
human interaction.
1) Trade-offs Between Passive and Active HCI Channels:
The handling channel yields the best results in terms of us-
ability because it requires the minimum amount of user effort.
However, such pairing schemes do not give a user fine-grained
control over the pairing process and provide less assurance
that pairing was established with the intended device. In
contrast, data relay, comparison and generation require more
user involvement but provide better control and assurance
of pairing. Yet, these types of interaction are susceptible to
user misbehavior and errors, which makes it necessary for
users to adequately understand the impact of their actions.
For example, if the generation channel is involved it is not
sufficient to only incorporate common user experience. It is
additionally required that the user is alerted if the generated
secret lacks sufficient entropy for its intended use, so that the
user can take appropriate action.
Hence, we identify an important trade-off between different
HCI channels. While passive user interaction can be viably
used for pairing in situations where no sensitive information,
such as financial or personal data, is involved. Active user
participation should be used for more critical applications,
for example, bank transactions, where user awareness can be
leveraged to increase security in device pairing.
2) Usability Properties: Two usability properties which are
crucial to augment both usability and security in pairing are
providing explicit user feedback, and ensuring insensitivity to
environmental conditions.
First, the importance of explicit user feedback was outlined
previously [35], [70], yet only a few pairing schemes provide
it in a meaningful way. However, the user feedback can
not only mitigate input errors, and present the evidence of
pairing devices, for example, that pairing with the intended
device was successful, but also assist a human operator with
security advice. For instance, if the user generates data to
produce a secret, the pairing mechanism can notify the user
if the provided input has sufficient entropy for the intended
application, or not.
Second, environment insensitivity is also vital for maxi-
mizing user experience. That is, a pairing scheme should
work for the intended use-case, irrespective of the ambient
conditions that might be reasonably expected to occur. Section
VI examines a range of specific use-cases exploring this topic
further. The key point is that these two factors interact, for
example, a pairing scheme that requires audio comparison and
confirmation from the user should not be expected to be used
in public scenarios.
3) Security Issues: The prior work emphasized the security
issues in pairing stemming from unintentional or deliberate
user misbehavior [8], [187], [207]. Interestingly, only two
pairing schemes (Playful Security [188] and Safeslinger [200])
accounted for such properties as inattentive user, rushing
behavior and consent tampering by design. Table II clearly
indicates that human interaction by itself does not bring any
security benefit if it does not consider threats posed by the
user behavior, for example, MANA [190]. Additionally, in our
analysis we introduced an honest-but-curious participant who
tries to obtain more information about the pairing party. The
motivation for this stems from a number of application classes
that we considered. Since social and public pairing are in scope
(Section VI), it cannot be assumed that all pairing parties are
benign and collaborative. For example, social engineering can
be used to infer extra information about another user or if
the sensing channel is involved another device or participant
can leverage this sensor data to violate privacy. Moreover,
human observation has not been well addressed in the pairing
literature. However, as we show under observation threats, the
situation is dire and this point must be taken into account if
the pairing scheme relies on human interaction.
24
4) Observation Threats: Regarding observation threats, we
focus on security implications in authentication techniques as
the adversary similarly tries to circumvent security by exam-
ining user interaction. The examples of malicious observation
include, but are not limited to, shoulder surfing, audio or video
analysis of the keyboard utilization and voice recognition.
Specifically, Halevi and Saxena [208] showed that keyboard
acoustic emanations can be used to successfully retrieve (even
random) passwords prompted with different typing styles.
Similarly, Davis et al. [209] proposed a method to extract
audio data from the high-speed video analysis in order to
perform acoustic eavesdropping without having a microphone.
More sophisticated attacks [210] exploited reflection from the
objects to reconstruct any confidential data displayed on the
screen of a device. Yue et al. [211] applied computer vision
techniques to show that it is possible, with 95% probability,
to reconstruct user input on the touchscreen of a mobile
device using a low resolution video of user interaction. Recent
attacks against voice verification [212] demonstrated that voice
impersonation is achievable with the success rate of 90% using
only a limited number of victim’s voice samples. In short,
observational threats are increasingly easy to achieve, and
therefore this risk should be taken into account when designing
SDP schemes.
In this section, we have investigated and discussed HCI
channels along with the SDP schemes utilizing them. In the
next section, we review the application classes and classify the
surveyed SDP schemes accordingly.
VI. APPLICATION CLASSES
In this section, we explore and analyze the four application
classes introduced in Section III. First, we describe each
application class with respect to typical interactions, as well
as its security and usability insights. Second, we categorize
the pairing schemes covered in Sections IV and V with regard
to their application classes and discuss the most interesting
results of this classification. Finally, we highlight important
open issues in SDP that have been identified in our study of
application classes.
A. Overview of Application Classes
An application class covers a set of similar SDP use-
cases, each of which involves a similar degree of involvement
and level of user control over the pairing process. We recall
the four application classes introduced earlier: a) private,
(b) public, (c) social, and (d) unattended. The private class
corresponds to a “classic pairing” case, where a single user
either owns or directly controls two devices that ought to be
paired. The public class is related to a single user possessing
one device, where the user performs the pairing with some
third party infrastructure, for example, a payment terminal,
over which she has no control. The social class incorporates
two users who would like to securely pair their corresponding
devices. The unattended class deals with the case where
two devices belonging to the same ownership domain, for
example, owned by the same person or organization, pair with
no user involvement. Figure 5 depicts the four application
classes, instantiated from our system model, to provide a better
understanding of the typical interactions for each application
class.
The ownership of the devices being paired plays a critical
role in SDP, necessitating its explicit consideration when
describing application classes. We recall that a security domain
is the set of devices, data, policies and intentions that a single
party controls. That is, a security domain refers to the limit
of enforcement of security policy by a particular owner or
controller of one or more devices. These security domains are
especially significant when more than one exists, as it allows
for security requirements of pairing devices to be differentially
achieved or undermined, either by the pairing process, or
subsequent actions of one of the pairing parties.
For example, consider Figures 5a and 5c. In Figure 5a, a
single user controls all devices, and so a single security domain
exists. Therefore, following a successful pairing procedure,
there are only two possibilities: either, the policy requirements
of the single security domain are met, or not. In contrast,
for Figure 5c, there are two users each controlling a separate
device, D1 and D2 respectively. In this case, if the security
policy requirements of each user differ, it may be possible that
the security policy of one user is satisfied, but not for the other.
Similarly, one of the users may later reveal information that,
without violating their own security policy, may violate that of
the other. That is, the presence of the second security policy
allows for a more complex set of outcomes, as compared to
if there were only a single security domain.
In the following, we expand on the four application classes
under consideration.
1) Private: Figure 5a depicts the well-known private class,
which applies when a single user either owns or controls both
devices. A good example of this scenario is pairing smart
devices that belong to the same person. In such a setting,
a rich set of HCI interactions are possible since a user can
freely communicate with and handle her portable devices in
many ways. The physical interactions between the devices, as
well as, with the ambient environment are user-enabled, and
only limited by the availability of hardware interfaces on the
devices.
From a security perspective, private pairing is often per-
formed in a rather restricted environment, for example, home
premises or a workplace, where such threats as external
observation and communication interception are reduced. The
private class consists of a single security domain, that is, all
devices are subject to the same security policy requirements,
because they are controlled by a single party. In this context,
the focus of the user tends towards usability, due to the combi-
nation of reduced perceived threats and the relative frequency
of pairing that may occur, especially given the increasing
numbers of devices that people own. Hence, usability must
be preserved and emphasized, even in the face of numerous
devices to be paired with one another. Despite the lower
perception of risk, it remains important to maintain security.
2) Public: The public class, shown in Figure 5b, corre-
sponds to the case where a single user possesses one device
but has no control over another device to be paired with.
For example, the user wants to pair her personal device, for
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Fig. 5. The four application classes. Each application class consists of two devices to be paired, each from a distinct security domain, except for the private
application class (a). The boundries of security domains are indicated by a dashed line.
instance, a smartphone, with a third party infrastructure such
as a public AP, a printer or a payment terminal.
In terms of HCI interactions, a human operator has fewer
options as compared to the private class, because the public
infrastructure typically has only a few common user interfaces
and cannot be moved, shaken or handled in a convenient way.
Similarly, physical interfaces used for communication between
the devices, as well as, with the ambient environment are
restricted and typically cannot be invoked by the user.
From a security perspective, the public class implies a more
hostile environment, that is, public places, as compared to the
private class. Thus, user actions during the pairing procedure
are subject to external observation, which can come in the
form of shoulder surfing or ubiquitous CCTV. Additionally,
an attacker can stealthily install rouge devices in the public
premises to interfere or hijack the pairing process.
The public class incorporates two distinct security domains,
namely the user with her device and the infrastructure, which
opens a door to a number of threats outlined in the following
discussion. In comparison with the private class, users are
likely to have an increased perception of security risks in such
public scenarios. Therefore, users may reasonably accept some
shift in the balance away from usability in order to improve
security. However, care must be taken not to reduce usability
to the point where users’ tolerance is exhausted.
3) Social: The social class, illustrated in Figure 5c, rep-
resents a case where two different users would like perform
pairing between their personal devices [15]. Pairing two smart-
phones that belong to different people is a good example of
such a scenario. It is obvious from the given example that
the social class implies two distinct security domains, that
is, two users with their devices. The presence of multiple
security domains can result in complicated security outcomes,
as previously described.
The reality of users’ concerns regarding these complications
can be observed, for example, through users’ reluctance to
hand their personal devices over to others. Explicit human-to-
human (H2H) interaction can be used to resolve this concern,
that is, to allow users to pair their devices, without losing
physical possession of them at any point during the pairing
process. Since users are interfacing with their devices individ-
ually, numerous HCI and physical interactions can be enabled
similarly to the private class.
With regard to security, social pairing is vulnerable to exter-
nal observation. On the one hand, the typical environment for
the social class may present lower inherent risk as compared
to the public class, for example, by occurring in a private
house instead of in public places. On the other hand, the
social pairing may still occur in a public place. Also, social
pairing procedures typically involve user interaction, which
is particularly at risk of observation attacks. Thus, while the
social class can suffer from a similar level of risk to the public
class, users’ perception of the risk may be lower, potentially
reducing their tolerance for security measures that harm us-
ability. Therefore, considerable attention should be given to
optimizing user experience for social pairing procedures, while
still ensuring adequate security.
4) Unattended: Figure 5d depicts the unattended class,
which applies when two devices perform pairing without any
user involvement. For example, two IOT devices, for instance,
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sensors, located nearby can pair and similarly wearables, as
well as, IMDs can be paired. In the case of wearables and
IMDs, a user is present, but acts only as a carrier of the
devices, and does not consciously participate in the pairing
process.
Since no user is involved, unattended pairing relies solely
on various physical interactions, especially those used for data
acquisition, that is, sensing. The key approach employed in
unattended pairing is to utilize various sensor capabilities to
measure the ambient environment over time. Thus, if two
devices continuously sense sufficiently similar contexts, they
interpret this as evidence of their physical proximity. When
two devices believe that they are in physical proximity, they
may then attempt to pair [19], [28]. The ambient environment
does not only refer to physical characteristics such as wireless
radio, audio, luminosity, humidity, etc. It can also correspond
to measuring the human body, for example, a heartbeat rate
[30] or muscle contraction [22], as well as, capturing user
specific actions, for example, a gait [25], [213], an approach
trajectory [214] or a head movement pattern [23].
In terms of security, the unattended class significantly differs
from other application classes since the pairing devices com-
municate in a standalone fashion without explicit user control.
This poses major security challenges, such as physical access
to the devices by an adversary, in addition to her ability to
efficiently monitor [122], disturb or even manipulate [75] the
pairing environment without being noticed. Moreover, it is not
straightforward to unambiguously define a number of security
domains in the unattended class. For example, the proposed
pairing schemes [19], [28] assumed that devices originated
from the same ownership, for example, either a user or the
infrastructure, and, thus, security domain. An open question is
the pairing of IOT devices which belong to different security
domains.
The unattended pairing is by definition an autonomous
process, removing all user interaction. It can be viewed
as pushing the usability-security trade-off completely in the
direction of usability. It is, therefore, not surprising that the
security properties of unattended pairing schemes are often
weaker as compared to the other application classes. Thus,
more research is required to devise more secure unattended
pairing schemes.
B. Classification of Pairing Schemes
To categorize different pairing schemes with respect to their
application classes, we used the following approach. First,
we considered pairing schemes that were surveyed in the
physical and HCI sections. Second, for each pairing scheme
we sought a particular use-case discussed by the authors, or
looked at the specific setting in which the implemented pairing
scheme was tested and evaluated. Using this information, we
explicitly assigned each pairing scheme to one or more of the
application classes. Finally, we considered for each pairing
scheme, whether it could be extended to other application
classes, either by an implicit reference in the paper, or by
considering the physical and HCI interactions necessary for a
specific pairing scheme, and comparing them with interactions
possible in each application class. Then pairing schemes that
rely on biometry and have been used in the field of IMDs,
for example, [30], are outside of the scope of this article, and
thus, are not included in these results, and are mentioned here
only for completeness. The results of our classification are
presented in Table III, and are discussed below.
In line with the prior research we see that most of the
proposed pairing schemes are aimed at the private application
class. The public class is the second most targeted application
scenario, followed by the social and unattended classes respec-
tively. It was also observed that many pairing schemes could be
extended to other application classes, especially schemes that
implement security mechanisms on the physical layer [55],
[56] or utilize contextual sensing [19], [28]. An interesting
trade-off exists between those two groups of pairing schemes.
While the former can offer provable security guarantees, it
requires low-level changes of the communication stack which
hinders the wide-spread adoption. In contrast, the latter group
can be more easily deployed, but lacks clear security guaran-
tees [75].
Another observation is related to pairing schemes deployed
in commercial products, for example, [17], [43], [54], [67].
Often these schemes are claimed to be applicable to multiple
of the application classes, irrespective of whether they are
suitable on the basis of their security properties. For example,
the PBC scheme [54] is available in both the infrastructure
mode, as well as for Wi-Fi direct [215]. However, PBC is
known to be vulnerable to MITM attacks, and the exposure
is much greater in public and social contexts as compared to
the private application class. Similar arguments apply to Just
Works [43] which is the Bluetooth pairing scheme. Two other
pairing schemes provided by the standardized bodies, namely
Near Field Communication [17] and Out-of-band [67] rely on
the NFC technology to transmit sensitive data, for example,
a device generated password, in plain text. Despite being
difficult, eavesdropping the NFC channel is not impossible
and the chance of successful attack is much higher in public
and social scenarios.
C. Discussion
Based on the investigation of the application classes, we
discuss three open issues that have not been resolved by the
prior research in SDP. First, how the presence of multiple
security domains introduces complications. Second, what pri-
vacy issues arise in the respective application classes. Finally,
whether pairing of devices should be valid indefinitely, or only
for a finite time.
1) Multiple Security Domains: Issues arise when pairing
devices belong to different security domains. The goals of
two pairing parties, and the assets they protect can vary. This
leads to security, privacy and usability implications that can
affect the adoption of a given pairing scheme. For example, in
the public application class the infrastructure side can provide
acceptable user experience, and a certain level of security,
but ignore users’ privacy. Since privacy awareness is growing
[216], many users may be reluctant to adopt a pairing scheme
with such a drawback. The opposite situation is also feasible,
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TABLE III
APPLICATION CLASSES - CLASSIFICATION OF PAIRING SCHEMES
Pairing Scheme Application classes
P
ri
va
te
P
u
b
lic
S
oc
ia
l
U
n
at
te
n
d
ed
Push Button Configuration [54]    #
Integrity codes [55] H#  H# H#
Tamper-evident pairing [56]  H# H# H#
Just Works [43]    #
Noisy tags [63] H#  # #
Adopted-Pet [64]  H# #  
Near Field Communication [17]    #
Out-of-band [67]    #
KeyLED [69]  H# H# #
Enlighten Me! [70] H#  # #
Flashing displays [71]  H# H# #
Talking to Strangers [7] H#  H# #
Loud and Clear [41]  H# H# #
HAPADEP [33]  H# H# #
Zero-Power pairing [76] # # #  
Ultrasonic ranging [79] H# H#  #
SBVLC [72]    #
Vibrate-to-unlock [80]  # # #
Shot [38] H# #  #
Vibreaker [81]  # # #
Amigo [27] H#  H# H#
Good Neighbor [84]  H# H# #
Wanda [85]   H# #
Ambient Audio pairing [28] H# H# H#  
Zero-interaction pairing [19] H# H# H#  
MagPairing [86] H# H#  #
Touch-and-Guard [21]   # #
MANA [190]  H#  #
Access point authentication [191] H#  # #
Shake Them Up! [192]  # H# #
Shake Well Before Use [193]  # # #
SAPHE [194]  # # #
Authentication using ultrasound [195] H#   #
Synchronized Audio-Visual Patterns [34]    #
RhythmLink [196]   # #
Seeing-Is-Believing [197] H# H#  #
Visible Laser Light [198] H#  H# #
VIC (mutual authentication) [199] H# H#  #
BEDA [33]  H# H# #
Playful Security [188] H# #  #
Safeslinger [200] H# #  #
Synchronized Drawing [185]  # # #
Proximity Authentication [201]   # #
Checksum Gestures [20] H#  # #
 -= explicitly applies; H#-= can be applied; #-= does not apply
when the infrastructure side aims to enhance security and
privacy, but this occurs at the expense of usability. In this
case, users may become confused, as they seek to understand
how pairing works. Such confusion could result in high error
rates, that can negatively affect both security and privacy,
as well as jeopardize the acceptance of the pairing scheme.
Similarly, in the social application class two users may have
completely different attitudes towards security and privacy.
Therefore, it should not be assumed that both participants
are always attentive, collaborative and security-motivated. A
pairing scheme that is designed to operate in the presence of
several security domains should take into account the possible
inconsistencies existing between them, and the impacts that
this can have on user behavior and resulting security.
2) Privacy Issues: Each application class differs from the
others in terms of the privacy risks and their potential impact.
The key privacy issues regarding each application class are
summarized below.
The private class is the least problematic, since only a single
user is involved, who directly controls both devices. Therefore,
all private information remains within the sphere of control of
the user involved. Nonetheless, there exists the potential risk
of observation attacks exfiltrating private information.
The public class introduces the risk of user tracking. Con-
sider, for example, a distributed service that allows paying
for the petrol in some area. Initially, a user pairs with the
terminal on a petrol station. Behind the scenes, the user is
being enrolled in the service, so that she can easily pay at
other stations without the need to pair again. This example is
both simple and realistic, and would allow the service to track
the users, significantly impacting their privacy.
The social class is exposed to the risk of honest-but-curious
participants. Such a threat can come in different forms, for
example, peeking at another person’s screen or observing her
actions, or making a deliberate mistake to get physical access
to the peer pairing device or retrieve extra data. None of the
surveyed pairing schemes considered this type of attack. This
is, therefore, a topic that justifies attention.
The unattended class is also prone to privacy leakage.
The surveyed unattended pairing schemes rely on contextual
sensing, which was shown to be plagued with privacy issues
[217]. Since IOT devices at home or wearables can disclose
a great deal of private information about the user and/or their
environment, unattended pairing schemes must account for
privacy protection during pairing. This presents, perhaps, the
most critical privacy issue uncovered during this survey. That
is, devices which can pair autonomously and may have access
to the considerable amount of private data currently rely on
the pairing mechanisms that do not take privacy into account,
and the current state of the art does not yet offer any solution.
3) Pairing Validity: Historically the norm for device pairing
has been to establish a “once and forever” pairing. However,
there are good reasons why this is not always the most sensible
approach, when instead the alternative may be more appropri-
ate, that is, a temporary or transient pairing. In the private
class, once-and-forever makes sense, where, for example, a
user wishes to pair her smartphone with her car’s entertainment
system. In such cases, there exists an expectation of a long-
term relationship between the devices, and that the devices
will continue to belong to a single, common security domain.
In contrast, many pairing scenarios in the public class are
more sensibly handled by creating transient relationships be-
tween devices, for example, when paying for a parking ticket,
printing or some other short-lived, transient activity. In such
situations the devices belong to separate security domains, and
the owner of one device has no control over the behavior of
the other, or its handling of any potentially private data. It,
therefore, makes no sense for the pairing relationship to endure
indefinitely. Indeed, there may be additional advantages to
transient pairing, for example, by preventing the user tracking.
An open question is how one should implement short-term
pairing in the public application class.
28
One approach would be to un-pair the devices after the
necessary operation has been completed. However, it should be
seamless and require no human effort, otherwise the usability
will be jeopardized. Recently, a similar problem was addressed
with respect to de-authentication [218], exposing the non-
triviality of designing such schemes in a secure way.
Regarding the social class, both transient and long-term
pairing may be applicable, depending on the social context
and the amount of trust two people put into each other. For
encounters of naturally limited scope or duration, for example,
the exchange of contact details at a conference, pairing two
devices permanently may be excessive. Furthermore, the level
of trust between people can degrade which is another argument
against pairing once-and-forever. Short-term pairing can also
provide users with better security and privacy assurances, as
the pairing is established only on an as-needed basis. This is
in stark contrast to long-term pairing, which can be abused
by another person or her device, for example, if the other
person’s device were to be compromised. However, if two
users communicate regularly, for example, colleagues, having
to repeatedly pair the same devices may be inconvenient.
Finally, considering the unattended class, the once-and-
forever paradigm does not take into account the highly dy-
namic nature of IOT environments. In such environments it
is already common to pair devices only if they are physically
co-located. It may, therefore, make sense to un-pair devices
whenever they conclude that they are no longer in close
proximity. Yet, it remains unclear how to handle such un-
pairing events, including how to determine when confidence
of physical proximity reduces such that un-pairing is justified.
In this section, we have discussed the application classes
and provided the classification of existing SDP schemes. In the
next section, we outline open research challenges and future
perspectives in the field of SDP.
VII. FUTURE CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVE
In order to design and build viable pairing schemes a wide
range of challenges and open issues need to be resolved.
We discuss several prominent challenges and provide a broad
outlook for future research. We begin by explaining the need
for creating adaptable SDP schemes, that are independent of
specific PHY and HCI channels. The importance of including
human interaction in the security chain is then discussed in
terms of its potential to improve both security and usability.
Following this, we explain why it is critical that the design
process of a pairing scheme begins with the target use-case or
application class, so that, again, security and usability can be
maximized for each application. Fourth, we emphasize that
SDP schemes currently lack ease of comparability, which
hampers evidence-driven improvement of the state of the art
for such pairing schemes. Finally, we highlight the problem
that user privacy is rarely considered by the current cohort of
SDP schemes.
A. Adaptable Secure Device Pairing
As has been shown through the course of this work it is
impossible to find a universal pairing solution. The selection
of both PHY and HCI channels highly depends on a number
of factors, including: application classes, the environment and
(social) context, potential attacks, the data to be exchanged and
availability of the channel. Thus, we argue that future research
should be conducted towards a more general framework for
pairing, which would take the aforementioned factors into ac-
count, and develop dynamic and customized pairing schemes
built upon various PHY and HCI channels. In this case, the
best security-usability trade-off can be obtained for a given
situation. Such a framework should offer a higher level of
abstraction, which would account for adding new factors, for
example, in a form of “rules”, that influence pairing, as well as,
PHY and HCI channels seamlessly. Finally, we stress that the
current design flow in pairing which starts with the hardware
capabilities should be fundamentally rethought.
B. Including Human Interaction in the Security Chain
So far, the role of human interaction in SDP has not been
fully acknowledged as fundamentally important. Yet, human
interaction is unavoidable in device pairing, for example, when
a user wants to have more control and assurance of the pairing
process. In our study, we have shown that human interaction
can be used to improve security if properly utilized. However,
users’ incentives for pairing, and the common HCI practices
in pairing have not been well-studied. Surprisingly, few pairing
schemes we reviewed accounted for mitigating user misbehav-
ior, or actually leveraging human involvement to achieve better
security. Thus, we advocate for making the HCI component
an indispensable part of the pairing design and outline several
points that are subject to future investigation. First, having a
continuous and transparent feedback loop between a user and
a pairing mechanism is crucial. As we stated before, feedback
to the user can mitigate many aspects of user misbehavior.
Also, the prior research relied heavily on human-perceptible
PHY channels, but the full potential of this property has
not been yet realized. For example, with the feedback loop,
both security and usability benefits can be obtained, such as
leveraging user perception to locate the source of the attack
to improve security, or making a human-device link more
interactive to improve usability. Second, more research on
basic user experience and its applicability to pairing should
be carried out to facilitate the creation of more usable and
error-resilient pairing schemes. Finally, we highlighted several
issues with regard to HCI observation attacks, however more
sophisticated analysis is required to evaluate security of HCI
channels.
C. Application Class Driven Design
Many of the pairing schemes surveyed were designed with-
out a particular application class or use-case in mind. However,
our findings have shown that each application class has unique
and often highly-divergent security and usability requirements.
Similarly, the sensitivity of the data being exchanged varies
considerably among use-cases [35], ranging from negligible,
for example, exchanging contact information at a conference,
to critical, such as performing internet banking transactions.
Therefore, it makes sense to begin the design process of a
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SDP scheme with the target data, use-case, application class
in mind. Only in this way can the resulting design be optimized
to the particular needs and opportunities afforded by the target
use-case. This optimization of the security-usability trade-off
is critical to ensure the best possible outcome.
D. Improving Comparability of SDP Schemes
A sound comparative analysis of different SDP schemes
was previously impractical, given the current design approach
that starts from hardware capabilities, instead of the target
application class or use-case. While the contributions of this
paper have facilitated comparison of SDP schemes, com-
plications remain, for example, due to the lack of distinc-
tion between PHY and HCI channels in most of the SDP
schemes surveyed. By shifting the focus to the target use-
cases and application classes, it becomes possible to identify
a set of implementation-independent security and usability
metrics. Those metrics could then be used to provide qual-
itative or quantitative comparison between different pairing
schemes within an application class. Building a more gen-
eralized attacker model within an application class would
assist in defining such security metrics. Derivation of specific
threat-models for each of the application classes would be
a particularly valuable contribution, as it would allow more
objective assessment and comparison of the security properties
of proposed pairing schemes.
E. Considering User Privacy
Prior research has not adequately addressed privacy issues in
SDP. Increasing numbers of user devices store sensitive infor-
mation and have sophisticated sensing capabilities with which
many aspects of users’ daily life can be directly measured
or inferred [219]. Privacy concerns relating to this exist, and
attacks that can obtain private data are feasible in the public,
social and unattended application classes. Several channels by
which users’ privacy can be readily violated were revealed
in the process of this survey. While not necessarily new
information, it is a clear reminder of the attention required to
devise systems that are privacy-preserving. That is why SDP
schemes should be designed with user privacy and the specific
target use-cases as the starting point, rather than physical
hardware capabilities or other factors taking the leading role.
Further research is also required to uncover hitherto undetected
channels by which privacy may be violated, so that they can
be taken into account in future SDP schemes.
In this section, we have discussed open research challenges
and future perspectives in the field of SDP. In the next section,
we provide the concluding remarks of our work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this survey, we proposed a system model and consistent
terminology to facilitate meaningful comparison and analysis
of SDP schemes. Our system model is based on the three key
components drawn from the design space of SDP: physical
channels, HCI channels and application classes.
With regard to PHY channels, the survey revealed that
data confidentially of the physical medium is very hard to
guarantee in practice. Emerging communication technologies
such VLC and mm-Waves offer improved security properties.
Other opportunities arise from the use of sensing of the shared
environment by nearby devices.
With regard to HCI channels, the importance was high-
lighted of building pairing schemes resilient to: (a) user
misbehavior, (b) observation of user actions during the pairing
process and (c) honest-but-curious adversaries. It is only
when these potential threats are properly considered, that HCI
channels can play a trusted role in SDP schemes.
We also introduced application classes as a means of clas-
sification of SDP use-cases. Through the identification of the
target application class, considerable insight can be gained that
can be used to guide the design of SDP schemes to optimize
the security-usability trade-off for a particular use-case. This
stands in contrast to the current practice of beginning with
physical hardware capabilities, instead of with the target use-
cases. This shift to use-case oriented design was also identified
as a necessary advance of the art. It is only by making this
change, that SDP schemes within an application can be better
compared in the future, whether qualitatively or quantitatively,
allowing for evidence-based design and comparison of SDP
schemes. Until this occurs, SDP schemes will likely continue
to fail to address the security, privacy and usability require-
ments of the various use-cases.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Jacqueline Brendel for her
insightful discussion on the security of cryptographic protocols
used in SDP. This work has been co-funded by the DFG
within the CROSSING project and the RTG 2050 “Privacy and
Trust for Mobile User”, the BMBF within the smarter project,
the LOEWE initiative (Hessen, Germany) within the NICER
project, and by the BMBF/HMWK CRISP. Dr. Gardner-
Stephen acknowledges the support of the DFG Mercator
Fellowship program, the Shuttleworth Foundation, the NLnet
Foundation and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade.
REFERENCES
[1] T. M. Anandan, “The Business of Automation, Betting on Robots,”
September 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.robotics.org/content-
detail.cfm/Industrial-Robotics-Industry-Insights/The-Business-of-
Automation-Betting-on-Robots/content id/6076
[2] Grand View Research, Inc., “Personal/Consumer Electronics
Market Analysis By Product (Smartphones, Tablets, Desktops,
Laptops/Notebooks, Digital Cameras, Hard Disk Drives, E-
readers) And Segment Forecasts To 2020,” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-
analysis/personal-consumer-electronics-market
[3] J. Gubbi, R. Buyya, S. Marusic, and M. Palaniswami, “Internet of
Things (IoT): A vision, architectural elements, and future directions,”
Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 29, pp. 1645–1660, 2013.
[4] Q. Jing, A. V. Vasilakos, J. Wan, J. Lu, and D. Qiu, “Security of the
internet of things: Perspectives and challenges,” Wireless Networks,
vol. 20, pp. 2481–2501, 2014.
[5] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L. A. Grieco, and A. Coen-Porisini, “Security,
privacy and trust in Internet of Things: The road ahead,” Computer
Networks, vol. 76, pp. 146–164, 2015.
[6] F. Stajano and R. Anderson, “The resurrecting duckling: Security issues
for ad-hoc wireless networks,” in International Workshop on Security
Protocols. Springer, 1999, pp. 183–194.
30
[7] D. Balfanz, D. K. Smetters, P. Stewart, and H. C. Wong, “Talking to
Strangers: Authentication in Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks,” in Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2002.
[8] A. Kumar, N. Saxena, G. Tsudik, and E. Uzun, “A comparative study
of secure device pairing methods,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing,
vol. 5, pp. 734–749, 2009.
[9] A.-S. K. Pathan, Security of self-organizing networks: MANET, WSN,
WMN, VANET. CRC press, 2010.
[10] S. Mirzadeh, H. Cruickshank, and R. Tafazolli, “Secure device pairing:
A survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 16, pp. 17–
40, 2014.
[11] R. Kainda, I. Flechais, and A. Roscoe, “Usability and security of out-
of-band channels in secure device pairing protocols,” in 30th IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P). ACM, 2009, p. 11.
[12] A. Kobsa, R. Sonawalla, G. Tsudik, E. Uzun, and Y. Wang, “Serial
hook-ups: a comparative usability study of secure device pairing
methods,” in 5th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS).
ACM, 2009, p. 10.
[13] M. K. Chong, R. Mayrhofer, and H. Gellersen, “A Survey of User
Interaction for Spontaneous Device Association,” ACM Computing
Surveys (CSUR), vol. 47, pp. 8:1–8:40, 2014.
[14] M. K. Chong and H. Gellersen, “Usability classification for spon-
taneous device association,” Personal and Ubiquitous Computing,
vol. 16, pp. 77–89, 2012.
[15] E. Uzun, N. Saxena, and A. Kumar, “Pairing devices for social
interactions: a comparative usability evaluation,” in ACM Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI). ACM, 2011, pp.
2315–2324.
[16] A.-R. Sadeghi, C. Wachsmann, and M. Waidner, “Security and privacy
challenges in industrial internet of things,” in 52nd Design Automation
Conference (DAC). IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[17] Wi-Fi Alliance, “Wi-Fi Simple Configuration Technical Specification
Version 2.0.5,” September 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.
wi-fi.org/download.php?file=/sites/default/files/private/Wi-Fi Simple
Configuration Technical Specification v2.0.5.pdf
[18] Bluetooth, SIG, “Security, Bluetooth Low Energy,” September
2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.bluetooth.com/∼/media/files/
specification/bluetooth- low-energy-security.ashx?la=en
[19] M. Miettinen, N. Asokan, T. D. Nguyen, A.-R. Sadeghi, and M. Sob-
hani, “Context-based zero-interaction pairing and key evolution for
advanced personal devices,” in ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS). ACM, 2014, pp. 880–891.
[20] I. Ahmed, Y. Ye, S. Bhattacharya, N. Asokan, G. Jacucci, P. Nurmi,
and S. Tarkoma, “Checksum gestures: continuous gestures as an
out-of-band channel for secure pairing,” in ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UBICOMP).
ACM, 2015, pp. 391–401.
[21] W. Wang, L. Yang, and Q. Zhang, “Touch-and-guard: secure pairing
through hand resonance,” in ACM International Joint Conference on
Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UBICOMP). ACM, 2016, pp.
670–681.
[22] L. Yang, W. Wang, and Q. Zhang, “Secret from Muscle: Enabling
Secure Pairing with Electromyography,” in 14th ACM Conference on
Embedded Network Sensor Systems (SenSys). ACM, 2016, pp. 28–41.
[23] S. Li, A. Ashok, Y. Zhang, C. Xu, J. Lindqvist, and M. Gruteser,
“Whose move is it anyway? Authenticating smart wearable devices
using unique head movement patterns,” in IEEE International Confer-
ence on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom). IEEE,
2016, pp. 1–9.
[24] X. Liang, T. Yun, R. Peterson, and D. Kotz, “LightTouch: Securely
Connecting Wearables to Ambient Displays with User Intent,” in IEEE
International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM).
IEEE, 2017.
[25] D. Schu¨rmann, A. Bru¨sch, S. Sigg, and L. Wolf, “BANDANA-Body
area network device-to-device authentication using natural gAit,” in
IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Commu-
nications (PerCom). IEEE, 2017, pp. 190–196.
[26] J. Grubert, M. Kranz, and A. Quigley, “Challenges in mobile multi-
device ecosystems,” mUX: The Journal of Mobile User Experience,
vol. 5, p. 5, 2016.
[27] A. Varshavsky, A. Scannell, A. LaMarca, and E. De Lara, “Amigo:
Proximity-based authentication of mobile devices,” Ubiquitous Com-
puting (UbiComp), pp. 253–270, 2007.
[28] D. Schu¨rmann and S. Sigg, “Secure communication based on ambient
audio,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 12, pp. 358–370,
2013.
[29] C. Zhao, S. Yang, X. Yang, and J. McCann, “Rapid, user-transparent,
and trustworthy device pairing for D2D-enabled mobile crowdsourc-
ing,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing (TMC), 2016.
[30] M. Rostami, A. Juels, and F. Koushanfar, “Heart-to-heart (H2H):
authentication for implanted medical devices,” in ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS). ACM, 2013, pp.
1099–1112.
[31] H. T. T. Truong, X. Gao, B. Shrestha, N. Saxena, N. Asokan, and
P. Nurmi, “Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay
attack resistance in zero-interaction authentication,” in IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
(PerCom). IEEE, 2014, pp. 163–171.
[32] C. Soriente, G. Tsudik, and E. Uzun, “BEDA: Button-Enabled Device
Pairing,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2007, p. 246, 2007.
[33] ——, “HAPADEP: human-assisted pure audio device pairing,” in 11th
International Conference on Information Security (ISC). Springer,
2008, pp. 385–400.
[34] R. Prasad and N. Saxena, “Efficient device pairing using ”human-
comparable” synchronized audiovisual patterns,” in International Con-
ference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS).
Springer, 2008, pp. 328–345.
[35] I. Ion, M. Langheinrich, P. Kumaraguru, and S. Cˇapkun, “Influence of
user perception, security needs, and social factors on device pairing
method choices,” in 6th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
(SOUPS). ACM, 2010, p. 6.
[36] T. Nguyen and J. Leneutre, “Formal analysis of secure device pairing
protocols,” in IEEE 13th International Symposium on Network Com-
puting and Applications (NCA). IEEE, 2014, pp. 291–295.
[37] K. Haataja and P. Toivanen, “Two practical man-in-the-middle attacks
on bluetooth secure simple pairing and countermeasures,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Wireless Communications, vol. 9, pp. 384–392, 2010.
[38] A. Studer, T. Passaro, and L. Bauer, “Don’t bump, shake on it: The
exploitation of a popular accelerometer-based smart phone exchange
and its secure replacement,” in 27th Annual Computer Security Appli-
cations Conference (ACSAC). ACM, 2011, pp. 333–342.
[39] T. Halevi and N. Saxena, “Acoustic eavesdropping attacks on con-
strained wireless device pairing,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 8, pp. 563–577, 2013.
[40] S. A. Anand, P. Shrestha, and N. Saxena, “Bad Sounds Good
Sounds: Attacking and Defending Tap-Based Rhythmic Passwords
Using Acoustic Signals,” in International Conference on Cryptology
and Network Security (CANS). Springer, 2015, pp. 95–110.
[41] M. T. Goodrich, M. Sirivianos, J. Solis, G. Tsudik, and E. Uzun,
“Loud and clear: Human-verifiable authentication based on audio,” in
26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
(ICDCS). IEEE, 2006, pp. 10–10.
[42] D. Dolev and A. Yao, “On the security of public key protocols,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 29, pp. 198–208, 1983.
[43] Bluetooth, SIG, “Simple pairing whitepaper,” 2006. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://mclean-linsky.net/joel/cv/Simple%20Pairing WP V10r00.
pdf
[44] Sophos Ltd., “Doctors disabled wireless in Dick Cheney’s
pacemaker to thwart hacking,” July 2017. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/10/22/doctors-disabled-
wireless-in-dick-cheneys-pacemaker- to-thwart-hacking/
[45] E. Marin, D. Singele´e, F. D. Garcia, T. Chothia, R. Willems, and
B. Preneel, “On the (in) security of the latest generation implantable
cardiac defibrillators and how to secure them,” in 32nd Annual Com-
puter Security Applications Conference (ACSAC). ACM, 2016, pp.
226–236.
[46] A. Dix, “Human-computer interaction,” in Encyclopedia of database
systems. Springer, 2009, pp. 1327–1331.
[47] R. D. Straw, The ARRL antenna book: the ultimate reference for
amateur radio antennas. Amer Radio Relay League, 2003.
[48] J. Terzic, E. Terzic, R. Nagarajah, and M. Alamgir, Ultrasonic fluid
quantity measurement in dynamic vehicular applications. Springer,
2013.
[49] M. D. Aime, G. Calandriello, and A. Lioy, “Dependability in wireless
networks: Can we rely on WiFi?” IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (S&P), vol. 5, pp. 23–29, 2007.
[50] F. Fund, “Run a Man-in-the-Middle attack on a WiFi hotspot,” https://
witestlab.poly.edu/blog/conduct-a-simple-man-in-the-middle-attack-
on-a-wifi-hotspot/, 03 2016.
[51] E. Bayraktaroglu, C. King, X. Liu, G. Noubir, R. Rajaraman, and
B. Thapa, “Performance of IEEE 802.11 under Jamming,” ACM Mobile
Networks and Applications, vol. 18, pp. 678–696, 2013.
31
[52] M. Schulz, F. Gringoli, D. Steinmetzer, M. Koch, and M. Hollick,
“Massive Reactive Smartphone-Based Jamming using Arbitrary Wave-
forms and Adaptive Power Control,” in 10th ACM Conference on
Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec). ACM,
2017.
[53] Z. Lu, X. Lu, W. Wang, and C. Wang, “Review and evaluation of
security threats on the communication networks in the smart grid,” in
Military Communications Conference (MILCOM). IEEE, 2010, pp.
1830–1835.
[54] Wi-Fi Alliance, “Wi-fi protected setup specification, version 1.0h,”
December 2006.
[55] S. Cˇapkun, M. Cˇagalj, R. Rengaswamy, I. Tsigkogiannis, J.-P. Hubaux,
and M. Srivastava, “Integrity codes: Message integrity protection and
authentication over insecure channels,” IEEE Transactions on Depend-
able and Secure Computing, vol. 5, pp. 208–223, 2008.
[56] S. Gollakota, N. Ahmed, N. Zeldovich, and D. Katabi, “Secure in-band
wireless pairing,” in USENIX Security Symposium, 2011, pp. 1–16.
[57] J. P. Dunning, “Taming the blue beast: A survey of bluetooth based
threats,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 8, pp. 20–27, 2010.
[58] D. Steinmetzer, J. Chen, J. Classen, E. Knightly, and M. Hollick,
“Eavesdropping with periscopes: Experimental security analysis of
highly directional millimeter waves,” in IEEE Conference on Com-
munications and Network Security (CNS). IEEE, 2015, pp. 335–343.
[59] T. Kasper, D. Oswald, and C. Paar, “Wireless security threats: Eaves-
dropping and detecting of active RFIDs and remote controls in the
wild,” in 19th International Conference on Software, Telecommunica-
tions and Computer Networks (SoftCOM). IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–6.
[60] A. Czeskis, K. Koscher, J. R. Smith, and T. Kohno, “RFIDs and
secret handshakes: defending against ghost-and-leech attacks and unau-
thorized reads with context-aware communications,” in 15th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). ACM,
2008, pp. 479–490.
[61] Y. Zhang and P. Kitsos, Security in RFID and sensor networks.
Auerbach Publications, 2009.
[62] A. Francillon, B. Danev, and S. Capkun, “Relay Attacks on Passive
Keyless Entry and Start Systems in Modern Cars,” in Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2011.
[63] C. Castelluccia and G. Avoine, “Noisy tags: A pretty good key
exchange protocol for RFID tags,” in International Conference on
Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS). Springer,
2006, pp. 289–299.
[64] G. T. Amariucai, C. Bergman, and Y. Guan, “An automatic, time-
based, secure pairing protocol for passive RFID,” in International
Workshop on Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy
Issues (RFIDSec). Springer, 2011, pp. 108–126.
[65] R. Zhou and G. Xing, “nShield: a noninvasive NFC security system
for mobiledevices,” in 12th annual international conference on Mobile
systems, applications, and services (MobiSys). ACM, 2014, pp. 95–
108.
[66] L. Francis, G. Hancke, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis, “Practical
NFC peer-to-peer relay attack using mobile phones,” in International
Workshop on Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy
Issues (RFIDSec). Springer, 2010, pp. 35–49.
[67] NFC Forum and Bluetooth, SIG, “Bluetooth Secure Simple
Pairing Using NFC,” September 2016. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://members.nfc-forum.org/apps/group public/download.php/
18688/NFCForum-AD-BTSSP 1 1.pdf
[68] J. Classen, J. Chen, D. Steinmetzer, M. Hollick, and E. Knightly, “The
Spy Next Door: Eavesdropping on High Throughput Visible Light
Communications,” in 2nd International Workshop on Visible Light
Communications Systems (VLCS). ACM, 2015, pp. 9–14.
[69] R. Roman and J. Lopez, “KeyLED-Transmitting sensitive data over
out-of-band channels in wireless sensor networks,” in 5th IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems. IEEE,
2008, pp. 796–801.
[70] M. Gauger, O. Saukh, and P. J. Marro´n, “Enlighten me! secure key
assignment in wireless sensor networks,” in 6th IEEE International
Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS). IEEE,
2009, pp. 246–255.
[71] T. Kovacˇevic´, T. Perkovic´, and M. Cˇagalj, “Flashing displays: user-
friendly solution for bootstrapping secure associations between mul-
tiple constrained wireless devices,” Security and Communication Net-
works, 2015.
[72] B. Zhang, K. Ren, G. Xing, X. Fu, and C. Wang, “SBVLC: Secure
barcode-based visible light communication for smartphones,” IEEE
Transactions on Mobile Computing (TMC), vol. 15, pp. 432–446, 2016.
[73] M. Rahman, U. Topkara, and B. Carbunar, “Seeing is not believing:
visual verifications through liveness analysis using mobile devices,”
in 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC).
ACM, 2013, pp. 239–248.
[74] TV-B-Gone, “How Does TV-B-Gone Work?” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://www.tvbgone.com/using-your-tv-b-gone/
how-does-tv-b-gone-work/
[75] B. Shrestha, N. Saxena, H. T. T. Truong, and N. Asokan, “Contextual
Proximity Detection in the Face of Context-Manipulating Adversaries,”
CoRR, vol. abs/1511.00905, 2015.
[76] D. Halperin, T. S. Heydt-Benjamin, B. Ransford, S. S. Clark, B. De-
fend, W. Morgan, K. Fu, T. Kohno, and W. H. Maisel, “Pacemakers
and implantable cardiac defibrillators: Software radio attacks and zero-
power defenses,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P).
IEEE, 2008, pp. 129–142.
[77] R. Mayrhofer and H. Gellersen, “On the Security of Ultrasound as
Out-of-band Channel,” in IEEE International Parallel and Distributed
Processing Symposium (IPDPS). IEEE, 2007, pp. 1–6.
[78] J. Clulow, G. P. Hancke, M. G. Kuhn, and T. Moore, “So near and yet
so far: Distance-bounding attacks in wireless networks,” in European
Workshop on Security in Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks. Springer, 2006,
pp. 83–97.
[79] R. Mayrhofer, M. Hazas, and H. Gellersen, “An authentication protocol
using ultrasonic ranging,” 2006.
[80] N. Saxena, M. B. Uddin, J. Voris, and N. Asokan, “Vibrate-to-unlock:
Mobile phone assisted user authentication to multiple personal RFID
tags,” in IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and
Communications (PerCom). IEEE, 2011, pp. 181–188.
[81] S. A. Anand and N. Saxena, “Vibreaker: Securing Vibrational Pairing
with Deliberate Acoustic Noise,” in 9th ACM Conference on Security
& Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec). ACM, 2016,
pp. 103–108.
[82] T. Schultes, M. Grau, D. Steinmetzer, and M. Hollick, “DEMO: Far
Away and Yet Nearby-A Framework for Practical Distance Fraud on
Proximity Services for Mobile Devices,” in 9th ACM Conference on
Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec). ACM,
2016, pp. 205–207.
[83] N. O. Tippenhauer, C. Po¨pper, K. B. Rasmussen, and S. Capkun, “On
the requirements for successful GPS spoofing attacks,” in 18th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). ACM,
2011, pp. 75–86.
[84] L. Cai, K. Zeng, H. Chen, and P. Mohapatra, “Good Neighbor: Ad hoc
Pairing of Nearby Wireless Devices by Multiple Antennas,” in Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2011.
[85] T. J. Pierson, X. Liang, R. Peterson, and D. Kotz, “Wanda: securely
introducing mobile devices,” in 35th Annual IEEE International Con-
ference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM). IEEE, 2016, pp.
1–9.
[86] R. Jin, L. Shi, K. Zeng, A. Pande, and P. Mohapatra, “MagPairing:
Exploiting magnetometers for pairing smartphones in close proximity,”
in IEEE 13th International Symposium on Network Computing and
Applications (NCA). IEEE, 2014, pp. 445–453.
[87] W. Kim, Y. Shin, and S. Seol, “Smart phone assisted personal IoT
service,” Advanced Science and Technology Letters, vol. 110, pp. 61–
66, 2015.
[88] J. Suomalainen, “Smartphone assisted security pairings for the internet
of things,” in 4th International Conference on Wireless Communi-
cations, Vehicular Technology, Information Theory and Aerospace &
Electronic Systems (VITAE). IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–5.
[89] Google, Inc., “Nexus tech specs,” September 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/6102470?hl=en
[90] M. Adeyeye and P. Gardner-Stephen, “The Village Telco project: a
reliable and practical wireless mesh telephony infrastructure,” Journal
on Wireless Communications and Networking (EURASIP), vol. 2011,
p. 78, 2011.
[91] P. Gardner-Stephen, “The serval project: Practical wireless ad-hoc
mobile telecommunications,” Flinders University, Adelaide, South Aus-
tralia, Tech. Rep, Tech. Rep., 2011.
[92] Google, Inc., “Wi-Fi Peer-to-Peer,” July 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/wifip2p.html
[93] W. Shen, B. Yin, X. Cao, L. X. Cai, and Y. Cheng, “Secure device-to-
device communications over WiFi direct,” IEEE Network, vol. 30, pp.
4–9, 2016.
[94] M. X. Gong, B. Hart, and S. Mao, “Advanced wireless lan technologies:
IEEE 802.11 ac and beyond,” ACM GetMobile: Mobile Computing and
Communications, vol. 18, pp. 48–52, 2015.
32
[95] S. Banerji, “On IEEE 802.11: Wireless LAN Technology,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1307.2661, 2013.
[96] M. Atenas, S. Sendra, M. Garcia, and J. Lloret, “IPTV Performance
in IEEE 802.11 n WLANs,” in IEEE Global Telecommunications
Conference and Exhibition (GLOBECOM). IEEE, 2010, pp. 929–
933.
[97] Motorola, Inc., “5GHz IEEE 802.11a For In-
terference Avoidance,” September 2016. [Online].
Available: http://www.motorolasolutions.com/content/dam/msi/docs/
business/ documents/static files/interference tb 0809.pdf
[98] A. B. M. Musa and J. Eriksson, “Tracking Unmodified Smartphones
Using Wi-fi Monitors,” in 10th ACM Conference on Embedded Network
Sensor Systems (SenSys). ACM, 2012, pp. 281–294.
[99] C. Ware, J. Judge, J. Chicharo, and E. Dutkiewicz, “Unfairness and
capture behaviour in 802.11 adhoc networks,” in IEEE International
Conference On Communications (ICC). IEEE, 2000, pp. 159–163.
[100] Bluetooth SIG, Inc., “Bluetooth technology basics,” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: https://www.bluetooth.com/what-is-bluetooth-
technology/bluetooth- technology-basics
[101] K. Scarfone and J. Padgette, “Guide to bluetooth security,” NIST
Special Publication, vol. 800, p. 121, 2008.
[102] T. S. Rappaport, S. Sun, R. Mayzus, H. Zhao, Y. Azar, K. Wang, G. N.
Wong, J. K. Schulz, M. Samimi, and F. Gutierrez, “Millimeter wave
mobile communications for 5G cellular: It will work!” IEEE Access,
vol. 1, pp. 335–349, 2013.
[103] K.-C. Huang and Z. Wang, Millimeter wave communication systems.
John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[104] IEEE Standards Association, “802.11ad-2012 Part 11: Wireless
LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)
Specifications,” September 2016. [Online]. Available: https://standards.
ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.11ad-2012.html
[105] Wi-Fi Alliance, “Wi-Fi CERTIFIED WiGig,” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/wi-fi-certified-
wigig
[106] S. Shankar N., D. Dash, H. E. Madi, and G. Gopalakrishnan, “WiGig
and IEEE 802.11ad - For multi-gigabyte-per-second WPAN and
WLAN,” CoRR, vol. abs/1211.7356, 2012.
[107] Y. Niu, Y. Li, D. Jin, L. Su, and A. V. Vasilakos, “A survey of
millimeter wave communications (mmWave) for 5G: opportunities and
challenges,” Wireless Networks, vol. 21, pp. 2657–2676, 2015.
[108] SiBEAM, Inc., “SiBEAM Captures World’s First 60GHz Millimeter-
wave Smartphone Design Win in Letv’s Flagship Smartphone, Le
Max,” September 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.sibeam.com/
en/News/2015/201505LetvsFlagshipSmartphoneLeMax.aspx
[109] HP Development Company, L.P., “HP Elite x2 1011 G2
- Connecting to the Wireless Dock,” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://h20564.www2.hp.com/hpsc/doc/public/
display?docId=emr na-c04587366#N10026
[110] S. A. Weis, “RFID (radio frequency identification): Principles and
applications,” System, vol. 2, 2007.
[111] EBV Elektronik, “RFID Selection Guide,” September 2016. [Online].
Available: https://cdn-shop.adafruit.com/datasheets/rfid+guide.pdf
[112] D. Sen, P. Sen, and A. M. Das, RFID for energy & utility industries.
Pennwell Books, 2009.
[113] D. Ma and N. Saxena, “A context-aware approach to defend against
unauthorized reading and relay attacks in RFID systems,” Security and
Communication Networks, vol. 7, pp. 2684–2695, 2014.
[114] S. Drimer, S. J. Murdoch et al., “Keep Your Enemies Close: Distance
Bounding Against Smartcard Relay Attacks,” in 16th USENIX Security
Symposium, 2007, pp. 7:1–7:16.
[115] G. Ho, D. Leung, P. Mishra, A. Hosseini, D. Song, and D. Wagner,
“Smart locks: Lessons for securing commodity internet of things
devices,” in 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security (AsiaCCS). ACM, 2016, pp. 461–472.
[116] A. Ranganathan and S. Capkun, “Are We Really Close? Verifying
Proximity in Wireless Systems,” IEEE Security & Privacy (S&P),
vol. 15, pp. 52–58, 2017.
[117] J. Thrasher, “How is RFID Used in Real World Applications?”
September 2016. [Online]. Available: http://blog.atlasrfidstore.com/
what-is-rfid-used-for-in-applications
[118] NearFieldCommunication.org, “How NFC Works,” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://nearfieldcommunication.org/how-it-works.
html
[119] K. Markantonakis, L. Francis, G. Hancke, and K. Mayes, “Practical
relay attack on contactless transactions by using nfc mobile phones,”
Radio Frequency Identification System Security (RFIDsec), vol. 12,
p. 21, 2012.
[120] M. Roland, J. Langer, and J. Scharinger, “Applying relay attacks
to Google Wallet,” in 5th International Workshop on Near Field
Communication (NFC). IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–6.
[121] M. Maass, U. Mu¨ller, T. Schons, D. Wegemer, and M. Schulz, “NFC-
Gate: an NFC relay application for Android,” in 8th ACM Conference
on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec).
ACM, 2015, p. 27.
[122] M. Mehrnezhad, F. Hao, and S. F. Shahandashti, “Tap-Tap and Pay
(TTP): Preventing the Mafia Attack in NFC Payment,” in International
Conference on Research in Security Standardisation (SSR). Springer,
2015, pp. 21–39.
[123] I. Gurulian, C. Shepherd, K. Markantonakis, R. N. Akram, and
K. Mayes, “When Theory and Reality Collide: Demystifying the
Effectiveness of Ambient Sensing for NFC-based Proximity Detection
by Applying Relay Attack Data,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.00425,
2016.
[124] S. Arnon, Visible light communication. Cambridge University Press,
2015.
[125] IEEE Standards Association, “802.15.7-2011 Part 15.7: Short-Range
Wireless Optical Communication Using Visible Light,” September
2016. [Online]. Available: https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/
802.15.7-2011.html
[126] S. Rajagopal, R. D. Roberts, and S.-K. Lim, “IEEE 802.15. 7 visible
light communication: modulation schemes and dimming support,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 50, pp. 72–82, 2012.
[127] A. T. Hussein, M. T. Alresheedi, and J. M. Elmirghani, “20 Gb/s Mobile
Indoor Visible Light Communication System Employing Beam Steer-
ing and Computer Generated Holograms,” IEEE Journal of Lightwave
Technology, vol. 33, pp. 5242–5260, 2015.
[128] P. H. Pathak, X. Feng, P. Hu, and P. Mohapatra, “Visible light commu-
nication, networking, and sensing: A survey, potential and challenges,”
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 17, pp. 2047–2077,
2015.
[129] T. Perkovic, M. Cagalj, T. Mastelic, N. Saxena, and D. Begusic, “Secure
initialization of multiple constrained wireless devices for an unaided
user,” IEEE transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 11, pp. 337–351,
2012.
[130] J. Rigg, “Smartphone concept incorporates LiFi sensor for receiving
light-based data,” September 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.
engadget.com/2014/01/11/oledcomm-lifi-smartphone-concept/
[131] S. D. Perli, N. Ahmed, and D. Katabi, “Pixnet: interference-free
wireless links using lcd-camera pairs,” in 16th annual international
conference on Mobile computing and networking (MobiCom). ACM,
2010, pp. 137–148.
[132] T. Hao, R. Zhou, and G. Xing, “COBRA: color barcode streaming
for smartphone systems,” in 10th International Conference on Mobile
Systems, Applications, and Services (MobiSys). ACM, 2012, pp. 85–
98.
[133] A. Wang, S. Ma, C. Hu, J. Huai, C. Peng, and G. Shen, “Enhancing
reliability to boost the throughput over screen-camera links,” in 20th
annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
(MobiCom). ACM, 2014, pp. 41–52.
[134] Q. Wang, M. Zhou, K. Ren, T. Lei, J. Li, and Z. Wang, “Rain bar:
Robust application-driven visual communication using color barcodes,”
in 35th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems (ICDCS). IEEE, 2015, pp. 537–546.
[135] J. Niu, F. Gu, R. Zhou, G. Xing, and W. Xiang, “VINCE: Exploiting
visible light sensing for smartphone-based NFC systems,” in IEEE
Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM). IEEE, 2015,
pp. 2722–2730.
[136] A. Barredo, “A comprehensive look at smartphone screen size
statistics and trends,” September 2016. [Online]. Available: https://
medium.com/@somospostpc/a-comprehensive- look-at-smartphone-
screen-size-statistics-and-trends-e61d77001ebe#.hg2igim7n
[137] Statista, “Global shipments of smartphones with a screen size of 5
inches or larger from 2012 to 2016 (in million units),” September
2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.statista.com/statistics/253350/
shipments-of-smartphones-with-screen-size-5-inches-orlarger/
[138] A. Dziech, J. Bialas, A. Glowacz, P. Korus, M. Leszczuk, A. Matiolal-
ski, and R. Baran, “Overview of recent advances in CCTV processing
chain in the INDECT and INSIGMA projects,” in 8th International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES). IEEE,
2013, pp. 836–843.
[139] E. T. Won, D. Shin, D. Jung, Y. Oh, T. Bae, H. Kwon, C. Cho, J. Son,
D. OBrien, T. Kang et al., “Visible light communication: tutorial,”
Project: IEEE P, vol. 802, 2008.
33
[140] J. Hallberg and M. Nilsson, “Positioning with bluetooth, IRDA and
RFID,” Master’s thesis, Computer Science and Engineering, Lulea˚
University of technology, 2002.
[141] Infrared Data Association, “What is infrared?” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://www.irda.org/
[142] Hackaday.com, “Hackaday TV-B-Gone Kit (v1.2),” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://store.hackaday.com/products/hackaday- tv-
b-gone-kit
[143] C. Burns, “Which phones let me control any TV?” September 2016.
[Online]. Available: http://www.slashgear.com/which-phones-let-me-
control-any-tv-24338249/
[144] S. Rosen and P. Howell, Signals and systems for speech and hearing.
Brill, 2011.
[145] A. Madhavapeddy, R. Sharp, D. Scott, and A. Tse, “Audio network-
ing: the forgotten wireless technology,” International Conference on
Pervasive Computing, vol. 4, pp. 55–60, 2005.
[146] M. Hanspach and M. Goetz, “On Covert Acoustical Mesh Networks
in Air,” CoRR, vol. abs/1406.1213, 2014.
[147] E. Lee, H. Kim, and J. W. Yoon, “Various Threat Models to Circumvent
Air-Gapped Systems for Preventing Network Attack,” in International
Workshop on Information Security Applications (WISA). Springer,
2015, pp. 187–199.
[148] B. Carrara and C. Adams, “On acoustic covert channels between
air-gapped systems,” in International Symposium on Foundations and
Practice of Security (FPS). Springer, 2014, pp. 3–16.
[149] HyperPhysics, “Sound Propogation,” September 2016. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/sound/sprop.html#c1
[150] Shure, Inc., “Microphone Techniques for Recording,” September
2016. [Online]. Available: http://cdn.shure.com/publication/upload/
837/microphone techniques for recording english.pdf
[151] R. Mayrhofer, J. Fuß, and I. Ion, “UACAP: A unified auxiliary channel
authentication protocol,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
vol. 12, pp. 710–721, 2013.
[152] HyperPhysics, “Ultrasonic Sound,” September 2016. [Online].
Available: http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/sound/usound.
html#c1
[153] KATHO, “MHz-ultrasound in air : a physical miracle?” September
2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.katho.be/apps.aspx?smid=2688
[154] S. J. OMalley and K.-K. R. Choo, “Bridging the air gap: Inaudible data
exfiltration by insiders,” in 20th Americas Conference on Information
Systems (AMCIS), 2014, pp. 7–10.
[155] F. Legendre, “How Google Nearby (really) works and what else
it does?” September 2016. [Online]. Available: http://blog.p2pkit.io/
how-google-nearby-really-works-and-what-else-it-does/
[156] R. L. Rivest and A. Shamir, “How to expose an eavesdropper,”
Communications of the ACM, vol. 27, pp. 393–394, 1984.
[157] S. J. Bolanowski Jr, G. A. Gescheider, R. T. Verrillo, and C. M.
Checkosky, “Four channels mediate the mechanical aspects of touch,”
The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, vol. 84, pp. 1680–
1694, 1988.
[158] N. Roy, M. Gowda, and R. R. Choudhury, “Ripple: Communicating
through physical vibration,” in 12th USENIX Symposium on Networked
Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI), 2015, pp. 265–278.
[159] Bump Technologies, “Bump,” September 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://bu.mp/
[160] T. Halevi, D. Ma, N. Saxena, and T. Xiang, “Secure proximity
detection for NFC devices based on ambient sensor data,” in European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS). Springer,
2012, pp. 379–396.
[161] B. Shrestha, N. Saxena, H. T. T. Truong, and N. Asokan, “Drone to the
rescue: Relay-resilient authentication using ambient multi-sensing,” in
International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
(FC). Springer, 2014, pp. 349–364.
[162] Google, Inc., “Sensors Overview,” September 2016. [Online].
Available: https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/sensors/sensors
overview.html
[163] E. Kaplan and C. Hegarty, Understanding GPS: principles and appli-
cations. Artech house, 2005.
[164] K. Fitchard, “Sensing Samsung: The evolution of sensors
in the Galaxy S series,” September 2016. [Online].
Available: https://opensignal.com/blog/2016/02/19/sensing-samsung-
the-evolution-of-sensors-in-the-galaxy-s-series/
[165] N. Roy and R. Roy Choudhury, “Listening Through a Vibration Motor,”
in 14th ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile Systems,
Applications, and Services (MobiSys). ACM, 2016, pp. 57–69.
[166] W. Wang, J. Lin, Z. Wang, Z. Wang, and L. Xia, “vBox: Proactively
Establishing Secure Channels Between Wireless Devices Without Prior
Knowledge,” in European Symposium on Research in Computer Secu-
rity (ESORICS). Springer, 2015, pp. 332–351.
[167] D. Ma, N. Saxena, T. Xiang, and Y. Zhu, “Location-aware and safer
cards: enhancing RFID security and privacy via location sensing,” IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC), vol. 10,
pp. 57–69, 2013.
[168] N. Patwari and S. K. Kasera, “Robust location distinction using
temporal link signatures,” in 13th annual ACM international conference
on Mobile computing and networking (MobiCom). ACM, 2007, pp.
111–122.
[169] A. Kalamandeen, A. Scannell, E. de Lara, A. Sheth, and A. LaMarca,
“Ensemble: cooperative proximity-based authentication,” in 8th inter-
national conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
(MobiSys). ACM, 2010, pp. 331–344.
[170] S. Mathur, R. Miller, A. Varshavsky, W. Trappe, and N. Mandayam,
“Proximate: proximity-based secure pairing using ambient wireless sig-
nals,” in 9th international conference on Mobile systems, applications,
and services (MobiSys). ACM, 2011, pp. 211–224.
[171] Y. Liu, S. C. Draper, and A. M. Sayeed, “Exploiting channel diversity
in secret key generation from multipath fading randomness,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, pp. 1484–
1497, 2012.
[172] L. Shi, M. Li, S. Yu, and J. Yuan, “BANA: body area network
authentication exploiting channel characteristics,” IEEE Journal on
selected Areas in Communications (JSAC), vol. 31, pp. 1803–1816,
2013.
[173] W. Wang, Z. Wang, W. T. Zhu, and L. Wang, “WAVE: Secure
Wireless Pairing Exploiting Human Body Movements,” in IEEE Trust-
com/BigDataSE/ISPA (TRUSTCOM). IEEE, 2015, pp. 1243–1248.
[174] W. Xi, C. Qian, J. Han, K. Zhao, S. Zhong, X.-Y. Li, and J. Zhao,
“Instant and Robust Authentication and Key Agreement among Mobile
Devices,” in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS). ACM, 2016, pp. 616–627.
[175] M. Zafer, D. Agrawal, and M. Srivatsa, “Limitations of generating a
secret key using wireless fading under active adversary,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking (TON), vol. 20, pp. 1440–1451, 2012.
[176] M. A. Sasse, S. Brostoff, and D. Weirich, “Transforming the ”weakest
link”-a human/computer interaction approach to usable and effective
security,” BT Technology Journal, vol. 19, pp. 122–131, 2001.
[177] A. Jaimes and N. Sebe, “Multimodal human-computer interaction: A
survey,” Computer Vision and Image Understanding, vol. 108, pp. 116–
134, 2007.
[178] S. Das, A. D. Kramer, L. A. Dabbish, and J. I. Hong, “Increasing
security sensitivity with social proof: A large-scale experimental con-
firmation,” in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS). ACM, 2014, pp. 739–749.
[179] S. Das, E. Hayashi, and J. I. Hong, “Exploring capturable everyday
memory for autobiographical authentication,” in ACM International
Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UBI-
COMP). ACM, 2013, pp. 211–220.
[180] S. Das, G. Laput, C. Harrison, and J. I. Hong, “Thumprint: Socially-
Inclusive Local Group Authentication Through Shared Secret Knocks,”
in ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI).
ACM, 2017, pp. 3764–3774.
[181] B. Schneier, Secrets and lies: digital security in a networked world.
John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[182] D. Besnard and B. Arief, “Computer security impaired by legitimate
users,” Computers & Security, vol. 23, pp. 253–264, 2004.
[183] D. Liginlal, I. Sim, and L. Khansa, “How significant is human error
as a cause of privacy breaches? An empirical study and a framework
for error management,” Computers & Security, vol. 28, pp. 215–228,
2009.
[184] A. Perrig and D. Song, “Hash visualization: A new technique to im-
prove real-world security,” in International Workshop on Cryptographic
Techniques and E-Commerce, 1999, pp. 131–138.
[185] M. Sethi, M. Antikainen, and T. Aura, “Commitment-based device
pairing with synchronized drawing,” in IEEE International Conference
on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom). IEEE, 2014,
pp. 181–189.
[186] S. Kraemer and P. Carayon, “Human errors and violations in computer
and information security: The viewpoint of network administrators and
security specialists,” Applied Ergonomics, vol. 38, pp. 143–154, 2007.
[187] N. Saxena and M. B. Uddin, “Secure pairing of ”Interface-constrained”
devices resistant against rushing user behavior,” in International
34
Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS).
Springer, 2009, pp. 34–52.
[188] A. Gallego, N. Saxena, and J. Voris, “Playful security: A computer
game for secure wireless device pairing,” in 16th International Con-
ference on Computer Games (CGAMES). IEEE, 2011, pp. 177–184.
[189] J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P. C. Van Oorschot, and F. Stajano, “The quest
to replace passwords: A framework for comparative evaluation of web
authentication schemes,” in 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (S&P). IEEE, 2012, pp. 553–567.
[190] C. Gehrmann, C. J. Mitchell, and K. Nyberg, “Manual authentication
for wireless devices,” RSA Cryptobytes, vol. 7, pp. 29–37, 2004.
[191] V. Roth, W. Polak, E. Rieffel, and T. Turner, “Simple and effective
defense against evil twin access points,” in 1st ACM Conference on
Wireless Network Security (WiSec). ACM, 2008, pp. 220–235.
[192] C. Castelluccia and P. Mutaf, “Shake Them Up!: A Movement-based
Pairing Protocol for CPU-constrained Devices,” in 3rd International
Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services (MobiSys).
ACM, 2005, pp. 51–64.
[193] R. Mayrhofer and H. Gellersen, “Shake Well Before Use: Authenti-
cation Based on Accelerometer Data,” in International Conference on
Pervasive Computing. Springer, 2007, pp. 144–161.
[194] B. Groza and R. Mayrhofer, “SAPHE: simple accelerometer based
wireless pairing with heuristic trees,” in 10th International Conference
on Advances in Mobile Computing & Multimedia (MoMM). ACM,
2012, pp. 161–168.
[195] T. Kindberg and K. Zhang, “Validating and securing spontaneous as-
sociations between wireless devices,” Information Security, vol. 2851,
pp. 44–53, 2003.
[196] F. X. Lin, D. Ashbrook, and S. White, “RhythmLink: securely pairing
I/O-constrained devices by tapping,” in 24th annual ACM symposium
on User Interface Software and Technology (UIST). ACM, 2011, pp.
263–272.
[197] J. M. McCune, A. Perrig, and M. K. Reiter, “Seeing-is-believing:
Using camera phones for human-verifiable authentication,” in IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P). IEEE, 2005, pp. 110–
124.
[198] R. Mayrhofer and M. Welch, “A human-verifiable authentication pro-
tocol using visible laser light,” in 2nd International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES). IEEE, 2007, pp. 1143–
1148.
[199] N. Saxena, J.-E. Ekberg, K. Kostiainen, and N. Asokan, “Secure device
pairing based on a visual channel: Design and usability study,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 6, pp. 28–38,
2011.
[200] M. Farb, Y.-H. Lin, T. H.-J. Kim, J. McCune, and A. Perrig, “Safes-
linger: easy-to-use and secure public-key exchange,” in 19th annual
international conference on Mobile computing & networking (Mobi-
Com). ACM, 2013, pp. 417–428.
[201] L. Li, X. Zhao, and G. Xue, “A proximity authentication system for
smartphones,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Comput-
ing (TDSC), vol. 13, pp. 605–616, 2016.
[202] H.-C. Hsiao, Y.-H. Lin, A. Studer, C. Studer, K.-H. Wang, H. Kikuchi,
A. Perrig, H.-M. Sun, and B.-Y. Yang, “A study of user-friendly
hash comparison schemes,” in Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference (ACSAC). IEEE, 2009, pp. 105–114.
[203] C. Kray, D. Nesbitt, J. Dawson, and M. Rohs, “User-defined gestures
for connecting mobile phones, public displays, and tabletops,” in 12th
international conference on Human computer interaction with mobile
devices and services (MobileHCI). ACM, 2010, pp. 239–248.
[204] R. Kainda, I. Flechais, and A. Roscoe, “Two heads are better than one:
security and usability of device associations in group scenarios,” in 6th
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). ACM, 2010,
p. 5.
[205] K. B. Rasmussen and S. Capkun, “Implications of radio fingerprinting
on the security of sensor networks,” in 3rd International Conference on
Security and Privacy in Communications Networks and the Workshops
(SecureComm). IEEE, 2007, pp. 331–340.
[206] S. Jarecki and X. Liu, “Fast secure computation of set intersection,” in
International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
(SCN). Springer, 2010, pp. 418–435.
[207] E. Uzun, K. Karvonen, and N. Asokan, “Usability analysis of secure
pairing methods,” in International Conference on Financial Cryptog-
raphy and Data Security. Springer, 2007, pp. 307–324.
[208] T. Halevi and N. Saxena, “Keyboard acoustic side channel attacks: ex-
ploring realistic and security-sensitive scenarios,” International Journal
of Information Security, vol. 14, pp. 443–456, 2015.
[209] A. Davis, M. Rubinstein, N. Wadhwa, G. J. Mysore, F. Durand, and
W. T. Freeman, “The visual microphone: passive recovery of sound
from video,” ACM Transactions on Graphics (SIGGRAPH), vol. 33,
pp. 79:1–79:10, 2014.
[210] M. Backes, T. Chen, M. Duermuth, H. P. Lensch, and M. Welk,
“Tempest in a teapot: Compromising reflections revisited,” in 30th
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P). IEEE, 2009, pp.
315–327.
[211] Q. Yue, Z. Ling, X. Fu, B. Liu, K. Ren, and W. Zhao, “Blind
recognition of touched keys on mobile devices,” in ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). ACM, 2014, pp.
1403–1414.
[212] D. Mukhopadhyay, M. Shirvanian, and N. Saxena, “All your voices
are belong to us: Stealing voices to fool humans and machines,” in
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS).
Springer, 2015, pp. 599–621.
[213] B. Shrestha, M. Mohamed, and N. Saxena, “Walk-Unlock: Zero-
Interaction Authentication Protected with Multi-Modal Gait Biomet-
rics,” CoRR, vol. abs/1605.00766, 2016.
[214] M. Juuti, C. Vaas, I. Sluganovic, H. Liljestrand, N. Asokan, and
I. Martinovic, “STASH: Securing transparent authentication schemes
using prover-side proximity verification,” in 14th IEEE International
Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON).
IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–9.
[215] Wi-Fi Alliance, “Wi-Fi Direct,” September 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/wi-fi-direct
[216] T. Cooper and R. LaSalle, “Guarding and grow-
ing personal data value,” September 2016. [Online].
Available: https://www.accenture.com/ acnmedia/PDF-4/Accenture-
Guarding-and-Growing-Personal-Data-Value-POV-Low-Res.pdf
[217] D. Christin, A. Reinhardt, S. S. Kanhere, and M. Hollick, “A survey
on privacy in mobile participatory sensing applications,” Journal of
Systems and Software, vol. 84, no. 11, pp. 1928–1946, 2011.
[218] O. Huhta, S. Udar, M. Juuti, P. Shrestha, N. Saxena, and N. Asokan,
“Pitfalls in Designing Zero-Effort Deauthentication: Opportunistic Hu-
man Observation Attacks,” in 23nd Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium NDSS, 2016.
[219] K. K. Rachuri, T. Hossmann, C. Mascolo, and S. Holden, “Beyond
location check-ins: Exploring physical and soft sensing to augment
social check-in apps,” in IEEE International Conference on Pervasive
Computing and Communications (PerCom). IEEE, 2015, pp. 123–130.
